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ABSTRACT 
 
Board Independence and Corporate Governance: Evidence from  
Director Resignations. (May 2005) 
Manu Gupta, B.E., South Gujarat University; 
M.I.B., Indian Institute of Foreign Trade 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. L. Paige Fields 
 
 As evident from recent changes in NYSE and Nasdaq listing requirements, board 
independence is considered an important constituent of firms’ corporate governance 
structures.  However, the empirical evidence regarding the impact of board structure on 
firm performance is mixed.  Since firms employ a variety of governance mechanism to 
control agency problems, the significance of board independence may depend upon the 
strengths of other governance mechanisms.   
I study the importance of board independence from the viewpoint of an investor 
by examining the market reaction to board member resignation announcements.  I then 
examine this market reaction in the context of each firm’s existing governance structure 
and business environment.  I find that investors react more negatively when an outside 
director resigns from the board than when an inside or gray director resigns.  More 
importantly, I find that investor reaction to outside director resignation is less negative 
when insider or non-affiliated blockholder stock ownership is high.  This evidence 
suggests that board independence and insider ownership and non-affiliated blockholder 
 iv 
ownership may serve as substitutes.  Furthermore, the evidence indicates that firms may 
require higher board oversight when a large part of managerial compensation is based on 
stock incentives.  This finding suggests that overly high levels of stock-based managerial 
compensation may exacerbate agency problems.  Taken together, these results have 
important implications for choosing an effective set of governance mechanisms that may 
work independently or in combination with each other to mitigate the agency cost of 
equity. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 16, 2002, the New York Stock Exchange filed proposed changes in 
listing requirements with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) that are aimed at 
ensuring board independence and improving corporate governance practices.  The NYSE 
requires that “the board of directors of each listed company to consist of a majority of 
independent directors”.1  Exceptions to this rule are available to closely held firms 
implying that high managerial ownership may substitute for board independence in 
improving corporate governance.  Shortly after the NYSE adopted its new requirements, 
Nasdaq proposed similar changes to their listing requirements.  The SEC accepted the 
proposal, and the listing requirements were changed on November 4, 2003. 
Institutional investors like the California Public Employee’s Retirement System 
(CalPERS) and their associations such as the Council of Institutional Investors (CII) 
started making similar guidelines for board independence five years before they were 
adopted by the major stock exchanges.  However, as recognized by CalPERS, the 
effectiveness of an independent board may depend upon the existing governance 
structure and the business environment in which the firm operates: “CalPERS recognizes 
that some of these (guidelines) may not be appropriate for every company, due to 
                                                 
This thesis follows the style of the Journal of Financial Economics. 
1
 Page 4. ‘NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to Corporate Governance’, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48745.htm 
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differing development stages, ownership structure, competitive environment, or a myriad 
of other distinctions”2. 
Other countries have also started paying attention to board independence as a 
means of improving corporate governance.  In 1990, the United Kingdom government 
appointed the Cadbury Committee to make recommendations on improving corporate 
governance.  The Code of Best Practice, issued by the Cadbury Committee included a 
recommendation for having at least 3 non-executive directors on the board.  The 1994 
Dey report submitted to the Ontario Exchange Commission led to changes in 
governance-related disclosure requirements for firms listed on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE).  Firms listed on TSE are now required to disclose the association of 
each board member with the management and the firm. They are also required to 
disclose whether or not a majority of their directors are unrelated to the firm. 
Agency problems arise when the owners (shareholders) give control to agents 
(managers).  The agents may focus on their own interests and thus deviate from 
shareholder value maximization.  This deviation between the goals of managers and 
shareholders may lead to losses in firm value.  Several corporate governance 
mechanisms have been suggested to reduce these agency problems.  Some of these 
mechanisms are external to the firm, like external capital markets, the managerial labor 
market, etc., while others are internal to the firm, such as monitoring by the board of 
                                                 
2
 Page 3, ‘Corporate Governance Core Principles and Guidelines’ CalPERS (1998), available at  
http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/US/page01.asp 
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directors, separation of the CEO and Chairman positions, and levels of debt in the capital 
structure. 
A number of empirical studies have examined the effects of board structure in 
controlling agency problems, mixed results.  Some of the studies examine the influence 
of a particular governance mechanism on a firm’s decisions.  For example, Weisbach 
(1988) finds that an outsider-dominated board is more likely to fire the top manager in 
case of bad performance.  Also, Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) present evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that outside directors vote in the interests of the shareholders 
when considering adoptions of poison pills.  Byrd and Hickman (1992) find that, in the 
case of tender offers, announcement period abnormal returns are much higher when 
outsiders dominate the board.  Additionally, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) examine the 
effect of an event that alters a particular governance mechanism, and find a positive 
market reaction to the addition of outsiders to the board.  Gupta and Lee (2004) report 
that firms with better governance pay smaller premiums for director and officer liability 
insurance.  The general conclusion of these studies is that an outsider-dominated board 
helps reduce agency problems.  However, Bhagat and Black (2001) use a simultaneous 
equations framework and find that there is no significant relation between board 
independence and firm performance.  Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) find a negative effect 
of the number of outsiders on the board on Tobin’s Q.  
Newly developed guidelines and listing requirements suggest that regulators and 
influential institutions like CalPERS consider board independence an important aspect of 
corporate governance.  These institutions and regulators, and their guidelines and 
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requirements, influence the investment decisions of a majority of investors.  Yet, there is 
no consensus in the financial economics literature to suggest that board independence is 
a necessary and/or sufficient condition for improving firm governance.  It is possible that 
other governance mechanisms may effectively substitute for board independence.  
Clearly, large and influential entities such as the SEC imply that board independence is 
desirable. Therefore, it is crucial that there be more and better evidence regarding the 
importance of board independence, and more specifically board independence as it 
relates to other governance mechanisms in providing effective corporate governance.  
Studies like Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997) 
examine investor response to director appointments.  While these studies appear to 
establish that director appointments are deemed to be important events to investors (a 
good first step), they do not investigate the effect of firms’ governance characteristics 
and business environment on investor reaction. Although Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) 
do examine multiple governance mechanisms, they do so in a static framework where 
the effects of the mechanisms on firm performance are assessed simultaneously. Also, 
Agrawal and Knoeber use Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance.  Tobin’s Q is not a 
clean measure of performance as it is also a proxy for risk and for growth opportunities.   
I examine the importance of board independence as perceived by investors 
conditional upon the existing governance structure and the firm’s business environment.  
This approach allows me to analyze whether or not shareholders consider board 
independence to be an important facet of firm governance, and under what conditions 
board independence may be desirable.  Specifically, I measure the market reaction to 
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abrupt changes in board structure that occur due the director resignations.  I then classify 
the outgoing director as insider, gray, or outsider depending on his/her affiliation with 
the firm.  The governance mechanisms that can potentially substitute for board 
independence are then identified by regressing the market reaction to director resignation 
on other mechanisms.  Investors will presumably be less concerned over a loss in board 
independence when the firm has other potentially effective governance mechanisms in 
place. 
Employing a sample of 299 director resignation announcements during years 
1990 – 2000, I find that firms with outside director resignations suffer an average 1.74% 
loss in market value over a three-day period surrounding the announcement.  Market 
returns from insider resignations is -1.17%, and gray director resignations result in 
insignificant abnormal returns during the same period.  This evidence suggests that 
investors are concerned over changes in board structure.  Using OLS regressions, I find 
that investors react more negatively to outside director resignations when the strength of 
other mechanism, as captured by a corporate governance index, is low.  When individual 
mechanisms are considered, officer and director ownership and non-affiliated block 
ownership are found to be possible substitutes for board independence.  The market 
reaction to a loss in board independence is more negative for firms with higher incentive 
compensation of their CEOs.   
The evidence presented in this study suggests that investors consider board 
independence an important aspect of firm’s governance.  Nevertheless, board 
independence is not the only mechanism that is employed to reduce agency problems.  
 6 
Other mechanisms like insider ownership, non-affiliated blockownership, top managers’ 
compensation, etc., may also work to mitigate agency problems.  These mechanisms 
may work independently or in combination with each other.  The results of my study 
suggest that to some extent a loss of board independence may be compensated for by 
employing other mechanisms like insider ownership and non-affiliated blockownership. 
Incentive compensation, though providing alignment of incentives between CEOs and 
shareholders, may itself increase agency problems if the high levels of stock-based 
compensation induce managers to commit accounting fraud.  In that case an independent 
board may be needed to provide important oversight. 
These results provide important implications for current changes in the 
regulatory environment.  The NYSE and Nasdaq recently changed their listing 
requirements.  Listed firms are now required to have a majority of independent directors.  
Exceptions to this rule are available to closely held firms suggesting that high 
managerial ownership may be viewed as a substitute for board independence in 
improving corporate governance.  My results are in agreement with the notion of 
substitution between board independence and high insider ownership.  Furthermore, this 
study identifies non-affiliated block ownership as another governance mechanism that 
may help resolve agency problems in the absence of an independent board.  The 
regulatory agencies may thus consider providing more exceptions to the requirement of 
board independence. 
Chapter II reviews literature related to corporate governance and board 
independence.  The hypotheses, data, and methodology are described in Chapter III.  
 7 
Empirical results are discussed in Chapter IV.  The conclusions of this study are 
presented in Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Theory 
This study is based on the concept of the agency problem of equity and the role 
of corporate boards of directors in controlling this problem.  In this section I provide an 
overview of agency theory and of the corporate governance literature. 
2.1.1 The Agency Problem 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) refer to agency problems as an essential element of 
the contractual view of the firm.  Agency problems arise because of the separation of 
ownership and control.  An entrepreneur/manager raises funds from investors to invest in 
positive NPV projects.  Investors give funds to managers because they need their human 
capital to execute positive NPV projects. Therefore, investors, who really are the owners 
of the firm, give control of the firm to the managers.  The managers have an implicit or 
explicit contract to return profits to the investors.   
The separation of ownership and control in the corporation leads to agency 
problems as described by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  In their paper Jensen & 
Meckling (1976) develop a model of the firm based on the agency problem.  When the 
entrepreneur/manager is the sole owner of the firm, he (or she) will bear the entire cost 
of perquisite consumption.  As the entrepreneur/manager invites other investors to invest 
in the firm, his ownership is reduced, he will bear only a partial cost of perquisite 
consumption and thus will increase his perquisite consumption.  Apart from excess 
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perquisite consumption like using company funds to pay for corporate jets or club 
memberships, managers can also reduce effort, expand the firm beyond its optimal size, 
and be more risk averse.  Jensen and Meckling show that managers will increase their 
perquisite consumption to the level where their marginal benefit of consumption equals 
its marginal cost.  Owners (shareholders) of the firm will anticipate manager’s affinity 
for perquisite consumption and will pay less for the proportion of their shareholding.  
This will lead to the reduction in the value of firm.  The costs associated with the 
separation of ownership and control are called the agency costs of equity.  
Jensen and Meckling discuss various ways of exercising monitoring and bonding 
activities.  In general, the mechanism to control the value-reducing actions of the 
managers can be categorized into external mechanisms and internal mechanisms.   
External mechanisms include threat of take-over, managerial labor market, legal and 
regulatory forces, etc.  Internal mechanisms include monitoring the managers using a 
board of directors and giving financial incentives to managers that are linked to returns 
to the shareholders.  Also, managers can deploy resources to control their actions; for 
example, they can hire auditors.  Jensen and Meckling assert that agency costs are the 
sum of the monitoring costs by the shareholders (principal), bonding cost by the 
managers (agent) and the residual loss remaining from unresolved agency problems. 
2.1.2 External Mechanisms 
Fama (1980) emphasizes that managers have substantial reputational capital 
invested in the firm and that the value of a manger’s human capital will depend on the 
firm’s performance.  Fama, therefore, argues that the managerial labor market may help 
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in aligning the incentives of managers with those of shareholders.  Labor market forces, 
however, may be constrained in disciplining managers when the firm operates in an 
industry that requires a very specific kind of human capital.  In fact, Parrino (1997) 
reports that it is easier to replace a manager in a homogenous industry then in a 
heterogeneous one.  Other than the managerial labor market, Jensen (1993) suggests that 
capital markets, product markets, and legal and regulatory forces may work to reduce 
agency problems.  He also describes how these forces are incapable of fully disciplining 
managers. 
Alchian (1950) presents an evolutionary theory of economic change.  If his 
theory is applied to corporate governance only the firms with governance structures 
conducive to changing environmental conditions will survive, and in the long run 
product market competition will eliminate firms with inadequate governance structures.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, argue that product market competition will help 
only when the “entrepreneurs rent labor and capital on the spot market every minute at a 
competitive price, and hence have no resources left over to divert to their own use.  But 
in actual practice, production capital is highly specific and sunk, and entrepreneurs 
cannot rent it every minute.”3 Jensen (1993) also agrees that product markets may be too 
slow to eliminate agency problems. 
Capital markets provide shareholders with an opportunity to discipline managers.  
Shareholders can sell their stocks to potential acquirers who can then replace the erring 
                                                 
3
 Shliefer and Vishny (1997) page 738. 
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managers.  Jensen (1993) recognizes capital markets as an effective means of controlling 
the value-reducing actions of managers.  He, however, argues that capital market 
activities are highly constrained by various legal and regulatory practices.  Many states 
allow anti-takeover amendments that make it difficult for capital markets to work freely. 
Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama and Jensen (1983) present 
a contractual view of a firm.  The entrepreneur/manager raises capital from investors and 
promises them returns on their investment.  Ideally, managers and shareholders will sign 
a complete contract that will specify managers’ actions in all the states of the world and 
how to allocate profits.  However, as pointed out by Grossman and Hart (1986), 
complete contracts are technically infeasible.  Legal and regulatory forces can help when 
the contracts are complete.  But in the absence of complete contracts, legal and 
regulatory forces are too blunt to perfectly or completely control agency problems. 
2.1.3 Internal Mechanisms 
With decreased effectiveness of external mechanisms, various internal 
governance mechanisms have evolved.  These internal mechanisms range from 
providing proper incentives to the managers to close monitoring by the shareholders of 
managers’ actions.  The following section provides a summary of some of these internal 
corporate governance mechanisms. 
Incentive Contracts and Managerial Ownership: Managers can be motivated 
to work in the interests of shareholders by making their compensation closely tied to the 
gains of the shareholders.  Fama (1980) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue for 
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incentive contracts like share ownership, stock options, or a threat of dismissal if 
profitability is poor. 
The problem of reduced effort by managers can be controlled by tying a large 
portion of managerial compensation to stock performance.  Managerial risk aversion can 
be controlled by increasing managers’ share ownership and option ownership.  
Performance linked compensation, and stock and option ownership should also reduce 
perquisite consumption by managers. 
These measures for controlling agency problems, however, come with their share 
of shortcomings.  As argue by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and Stulz (1988), high 
managerial stock ownership will make a manager’s dismissal more difficult.  It will also 
reduce the probability of a takeover.  Stulz further suggests there is a non-linear relation 
between the fraction of managerial control of voting rights and firm value.  As the 
fraction of votes controlled by managers increases, the probability of takeover decreases 
but the takeover premium increases.  Similarly, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find 
a non-linear relationship between firm value and managerial ownership.  Initially, as 
managerial ownership increases from zero, and managers’ incentives get closely aligned 
with those of the shareholders, there is a decrease in agency problems and thus an 
increase in firm value.  However, as managerial ownership increases beyond a certain 
level, managers tend to get more entrenched and their dismissal becomes more difficult, 
leading to decreased firm value. 
Performance-linked compensation contracts also have their shortcomings.  If the 
compensation of the managers is too closely linked to stock performance, managers may 
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take actions that benefit the firm only in the short-term.  This problem may be especially 
severe when the CEO of a firm is close to retirement and is more concerned about short-
term benefits to the firm.  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude that incentive contracts 
help in controlling agency problems but are incapable of completely solving this 
problem. 
CEO – Chairman Separation:  Fama and Jensen (1983) divide an 
organization’s decision process into four steps: initiation, ratification, implementation, 
and monitoring.  They combine initiation and implementation under decision 
management.  Ratification and implementation is similarly combined in decision control.  
When applied to a firm, decision management is done by the management team of the 
firm headed by the CEO.  Decision control is done by the board of directors headed by 
the Chairman of the Board.  When the decision manager, i.e. the CEO of the firm, is not 
the major residual claimant, as is the typical case with modern corporations, decision 
control becomes an important part of the decision process.  As stated by Fama and 
Jensen “Without effective control procedures, such decision managers are more likely to 
take actions that deviate from the interests of residual claimants.  An effective system for 
decision control implies, almost by definition, that the control (ratification and 
monitoring) of decisions is to some extent separate from the management (initiation and 
implementation) of decisions.”4 One way to separate the decision control and 
management processes is to have CEO – Chairman separation.  Jensen (1993) also 
argues in favor of separation of the CEO and Chairman positions. 
                                                 
4
 Fama and Jensen (1983) Page 304. 
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 Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997), however, argue that the monitoring benefits 
of CEO-Chairman separation may be offset by the costs associated with maintaining 
such leadership.  These costs include the cost of sharing information between the CEO 
and Chairman, shifting blame in case of poor performance, etc. 
Monitoring by Board of Directors: Shareholders provide capital to the 
entrepreneurs/managers and expect returns on their investments.  However, shareholders 
are considered residual claimants as they are given a part of the profits only after 
bondholders are paid.  Shareholders accept residual claims in exchange for control rights 
and the ability to monitor and select the managers.  Due to the dispersed nature of share 
ownership, shareholders elect a board of directors to do the monitoring.  Shareholders 
also have the right to vote on important corporate matters like mergers and acquisitions.  
It is the duty of the directors of corporate boards to look after the interest of the 
shareholders. 
Monitoring by the board of directors itself presents an agency problem as board 
members (agents) are expected to monitor managers on behalf of the shareholders 
(principals).  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) claim that the structure of a board can be an 
important determinant of its effectiveness.  
The structure of a board is determined by the type of members that constitute the 
board.  Yermack (2002) classifies a director as an insider if he/she is also an employee of 
the firm.  Non-employee directors are classified as outside or gray (affiliated) directors.  
Gray directors are those with disclosed conflicts of interest.  These conflicts include 
special consulting contracts for the director, former employee of the firm, a significant 
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business relationship between the firm and the director’s main employer, a family 
relationship between the director and a top manager, and interlocking board 
memberships between the director and the CEO.  All other directors are classified as 
outsiders. 
Fama (1980) describes the board as a “market-induced mechanism” and suggests 
a role for inside, outside, and gray directors.  According to Fama, the presence of an 
inside director on the board may add value to the firm as insiders are more informed and 
face competition from their peers for the top positions within the firm.  He, however, 
asserts that the insiders may collude and render the board ineffective.  He therefore 
advocates the presence of outside directors on the board.  He also argues that the 
reputational capital of outside directors depends on the performance of the firm and thus 
it is in the interests of the outside directors that the firm performs well.  Fama and Jensen 
(1983) consider boards as groups of experts and suggest that insiders play an important 
role in bringing information to the board.  They assert that the presence of outsiders is 
important for making certain decisions like executive compensation where insiders may 
not have the right incentives.  
 Directors have a fiduciary responsibility to look after the interest of the 
shareholders.  Shareholders can sue the directors if they feel they are not doing a proper 
job.  Threat of legal action may also provide incentives to the directors. 
Outside directors may also be influenced by the managers.  Jensen (1993) argues 
that outside directors are more likely to be aligned with the top managers because the top 
management decides who serves on the board.  He also argues that the outside board 
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members’ stockholdings in the firms are too small to align their incentives with those of 
shareholders. 
The structure of the board may depend on many factors including regulatory 
issues.  Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest board structure is determined by an 
implicit negotiation between the CEO and board.  The CEO’s negotiating power 
decreases as the performance of the firm deteriorates and the board seeks more 
independence.  Regulatory requirements may also determine board structures for firms 
in the same industries.  In general, outsiders are considered to be better monitors. 
Blockholder: Investors with large blocks of shares may also monitor managers.  
Large investors can discipline managers either in their role as directors on the board (if 
applicable) or by selling their shares, thereby depressing the stock price and making it 
more likely to be a takeover target.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that large 
shareholders can help in disciplining managers by helping an acquirer take over the firm 
when the firm performance is not satisfactory.  Large shareholders with significant 
control of voting rights can also further shareholders’ interest by proxy fights.   
There are some disadvantages to monitoring by blockholders.  Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) suggest that large investors are not diversified, and hence bear excessive risk.  
This lack of diversification can make large shareholders less risk tolerant than other 
well-diversified shareholders.  Large shareholders might try to treat themselves 
preferentially at the expense of other shareholders.  Rajan (1992) presents a theoretical 
model explaining how banks can extract rents from investors by using their 
informational advantage.  On the other hand, Grossman and Hart (1980) argue that 
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blockholders are at a disadvantage because they have to spend significant resources in 
monitoring managers, but the benefits of monitoring are shared by all shareholders.  
They refer to this problem as the free-rider problem.  Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
however, claim that the informational advantage to the blockholders will compensate for 
the free-rider problem.   
Admati, Pfeiderer, and Zechner (1994) show that even though there are free rider 
problems associated with monitoring by large shareholders, an equilibrium can be 
achieved because of risk sharing considerations.  Blockholders may also use market 
routes to exit firms with high agency problems.  In fact, Bhide (1993) argues that the 
liquidity of stocks in the stock market may hinder effective governance.  According to 
him, a liquid stock market reduces large shareholders’ incentives to monitor because it 
allows them to sell their stocks easily.  Ernst (1998) argues that a large investor will have 
two investment objectives, monitoring firms in order to benefit from reduced agency 
problems, and trading on private information in public markets.  Liquidity makes it less 
costly to hold large stakes and easier to purchase addition shares.  Thus, liquid markets 
can help in removing the free rider problem by creating opportunities for large 
shareholder to dispose of their shares ahead of expected decreases in price.  Large 
shareholder by way of monitoring will have information about the firm that small 
shareholders won’t have.  In this way, large shareholders can extract rents for monitoring 
at the cost of small shareholders.  Part of the incentive also comes from the ability to 
purchase addition shares in the stock market at a price that does not reflect the firms’ 
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improvements due to monitoring by large shareholders.  As a result large shareholders 
will increasingly engage in monitoring as the liquidity of the market increases.   
Blockholders are also of different types and can have different motives for 
monitoring managers.  Blockholders can be venture capitalists, individual investors, and 
financial institutions.  Financial institutions can further be divided into private and public 
institutions.  Woidtke (2002) suggests that the motivation of financial institutions can be 
substantially different for public versus private pension funds.  She argues that the 
managers of public pension funds are politically elected and thus, have a political agenda 
that may not coincide with maximization of firm value.  Romano (2001) also recognizes 
differences in the motivations of financial institutions in disciplining managers and 
argues that public pension funds sometimes influence corporations to pursue their own 
political and social objectives rather than encourage firms to maximize value.  Some of 
the blockholders, such as banks and insurance companies, may also be influenced by 
managers as these institutions have business association with the firm.   
2.2 Empirical Evidence 
In this section I discuss the empirical findings regarding agency problems and the 
role of different corporate governance mechanisms in disciplining the managers.   
2.2.1 Empirical Evidence Regarding the Agency Problem 
Most of the empirical evidences on agency problems stems from the market 
reaction to different managerial actions and long-term effects of these actions on firm 
performance.  Reduced effort by managers has been recognized as a significant agency 
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problem.  Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) report a negative stock price reaction to 
announcements that an executive of the firm has accepted a board seat at another firm.  
Booth and Deli (1996), however, report that there is no direct evidence linking such 
outside activity to several measures of shirking and perk consumption. 
Managers may have significant personal wealth tied to the firm that may increase 
their risk aversion.  Managers may also have different planning horizons than the 
shareholders.  These kinds of problems have been recognized as differential risk and 
horizon problems.  Researchers have shown that managers try to reduce the risk of the 
firm.  Lang and Stulz (1994), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Berger and Ofek (1995) 
show that managers tend to diversify the firm’s total risk.  They also show that 
shareholder reactions to diversification are negative, suggesting that diversification 
reduces value.  The differential horizon problem was recognized by Murphy and 
Zimmerman (1993), who find a decline in R&D expenditure when firms have CEOs 
nearing retirement. 
Roll (1986) argues that managers engage in takeovers to build empires.  Jensen 
(1986) agrees with Roll and suggests that this problem is more prevalent when firms 
have free cash flow.  Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) show that bidder returns are 
lowest when the acquisitions are diversifying in nature.  This shows that markets punish 
empire building exercises. 
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2.2.1 Empirical Evidence Regarding the Governance Mechanisms 
Incentive Contracts: Equity-based compensation including stock options, 
restricted-stock awards, stock appreciation right, etc.  has been recognized as a 
mechanism for reducing agency problems.  Brickley, Bhagat, and Lease (1985) present 
evidence that the market rewards firms adopting stock based compensation.  They report 
a 2.4% appreciation in firm value when firms adopt stock based compensation packages.  
DeFusco, Johnson, and Zorn (1990) report that managers tend to be more risk taking 
when their compensation is more equity based.  They measure risk taking by measuring 
the variability of stock returns.  Mehran (1995) also documents a positive relation 
between Tobin’s Q and insider ownership.   
The above reported evidence supports the argument that stock-based 
compensation helps in reducing agency problems.  The effectiveness of these 
compensation measures is revealed by whether managers’ compensation in general is 
sensitive to firm performance.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) examine the sensitivity of 
CEO pay to shareholder returns for the firms listed in Executive compensation surveys 
published in Forbes from 1974 to 1986.  They report that the change in CEO salary is 
only 75 cents for every $1000 change in shareholders wealth.  They also consider the 
change in CEO wealth due to change in value of their stock ownership.  The median 
change in value of CEOs’ stocks is just $2.5 for every $1000 change in shareholders 
wealth.  Thus the total effect of changes in CEO wealth is $3.25 for every $1000 change 
in shareholders wealth.  Jensen and Murpy conclude that the CEO compensation 
sensitivity to shareholders wealth is too low to rectify agency problems.  One of the 
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shortcomings of this paper is that the presence of other governance mechanisms is 
ignored.  As Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) point out, many of these mechanisms work in 
tandem and other things like the managerial labor market may be affecting the pay-
performance sensitivity.  Palia (2001) also raises similar objections about the 
endogeneity of management compensation and firm performance.  Using a panel data 
approach to control for unobservable variables, he shows that firms are in equilibrium 
when they endogenously set their CEO’s compensation.   
The nature of the industry and competitiveness within the industry may also 
determine pay-performance sensitivity.  Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker (2003) show that 
new economy firms have much higher pay-performance sensitivity then old economy 
firm, which is consistent with an agency argument as these new economy firms are more 
likely to have agency problems due to higher information asymmetry.  They define ‘new 
economy’ firms as those operating in the computer, software, internet, 
telecommunications, or networking fields.  Murphy (2003), however, claims that some 
of the Ittner, Lambert, and Larcker results may be due to differences in accounting 
practices and competitive difference in the two industry types. 
Pay-performance sensitivity may have changed over the last few years, mainly 
due to changes in the nature of firms.  Murphy (1999) reports that pay-performance 
sensitivity nearly doubled by 1996 to approximately $6 per $1000 change in shareholder 
wealth.  Young firms tend to have even higher pay-performance sensitivity.  Baker and 
Gompers (1999) report much higher pay-performance sensitivity for IPO firm.  They 
also report higher pay-performance sensitivity for venture-backed firms. 
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As summarized by Murphy (1999), pay-performance sensitivity depends on firm 
size and in the U.S. has dramatically increased during the last decade.  Most of the 
improvement in pay-performance sensitivity is attributable to more frequent adoption of 
stock options. 
Managerial Ownership: As suggested by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the basic 
source of the agency problem is less than 100% ownership by the managers.  Thus, 
increasing managerial ownership may help in reducing agency problem.  Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1988) examine the relation between Tobin’s Q and managerial and board 
ownership for a sample of Fortune 500 firms.  They find a curvilinear relationship where 
Tobin’s Q is an increasing function of managerial (including board members) ownership 
for 0% - 5% ownership levels.  Tobin’s Q decreases for 5% - 25% ownership levels and 
again increases beyond 25% managerial ownership.  They suggest that this curvilinear 
pattern is a result of two forces acting on the firm.  Between 0% and 5%, the increase in 
ownership provides incentives to the managers to work in the interest of the shareholders 
and the threat of dismissal is still substantial, but as managerial ownership rises beyond 
5%, managers become entrenched.  This leads to a decrease in firm value.  However, 
beyond 25% managerial ownership, managers own such a significant portion of the firm 
that their incentives are very closely aligned with those of shareholders.  McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) also find a quadratic relation between insider ownership and Tobin’s Q. 
The studies by Morck, Shliefer and Vishny (1988) and McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) suffer from a weakness in that they consider insider ownership exogenous to firm 
performance.  It is possible that managers increase their ownership in highly profitable 
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firms and reduce their holdings in poorly performing firms.  Objections can also be 
raised about their use of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm performance.  Tobin’s Q is also 
recognized as a proxy for risk in the investments literature (Fama and French (1992)), 
and as a proxy for investment opportunities.  Therefore, it is not clear whether Tobin’s Q 
used in these papers really represents firm performance. 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) address this concern about endogeneity and 
examine the relation using an instrumental variables approach.  For a panel of 174 
NYSE firms they find a curvilinear relation between management ownership and 
Tobin’s Q.  However, the concern about the use of Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm 
performance is not addressed.  Han and Suk (1998) recognize the problems with Tobin’s 
Q and use long-term stock returns as a measure of firm performance.  They also include 
the independent variables squared to control for nonlinearity.  They find a positive 
relation between firm performance and insider ownership, but the square of the insider 
ownership is negatively related.  They use buy-and-hold returns for firm performance.  
However, as recognized by Han and Suk, buy-and-hold returns also suffer from serious 
biases. 
Himmelberg, Hubbard, Palia (1999) use a panel data approach to examine the 
endogeneity of insider ownership and firm performance.  They argue that low insider 
ownership may not be a suboptimal compensation design but may be endogenously 
determined by the contracting environment.  In particular, the low levels of insider 
ownership might be optimal if the agency problem is not severe.  They use stock price 
variability, firm size, capital intensity, R&D expenses, and capital expenditure rates as 
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determinants of insider ownership.  They find that it is difficult to establish a relation 
between Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership, after controlling for fixed effects. 
Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) examine the relation between operating 
performance and managerial ownership for IPO firms.  They find that the operating 
performance of the firm decreases and so does managerial (including directors) 
ownership from a year before to a year after firms go public.  Managerial (including 
director) ownership continues to decrease until ten years after the IPO; however, there is 
no significant decrease in operating performance until ten years after the IPO.  They 
conclude that for their sample there is no significant relation between managerial 
ownership and firm operating performance. 
Even though the evidence about the relation between managerial ownership and 
firm performance is mixed, there is some evidence that managerial ownership may 
indirectly affect firm performance by influencing other factors like top management 
turnover.  Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) find that the probability of top executive 
turnover is negatively related to insider ownership.  Thus, the effect of managerial 
ownership on firm performance may come from the indirect effect on top executive 
turnover, board structure, etc. 
CEO-Chairman Separation: There is mixed evidence on the benefits of having 
separate CEO-Chairman positions.  Pi and Timme (1993), and Goyal and Park (2002) 
provide evidence in support of Chairman and CEO separation.  They also find CEO 
turnover and firm performance sensitivity to be lower in case the CEO and Chairman 
posts are held by the same person, and report lower cost efficiency and return on assets 
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for banks with CEO-Chairman duality.  Faleye (2003), however, reports that CEO-
Chairman separation may not be an optimum solution for all kinds of firms. 
Board of Directors: The quality of monitoring by the board of directors is 
usually attributed to its size and structure.  The structure of a board refers to the kind of 
directors (inside, outside, or gray) it has.  CalPERS5 adopted core principles for 
corporate governance in 1998 and recommended: “1. A substantial majority of the board 
consists of directors who are independent.  2. Independent directors meet periodically (at 
least once a year) alone, without the CEO or other non-independent directors.” Similar 
guidelines have been adopted by other institutions like the Council of Institutional 
Investors6.  Thus, in general board independence is recognized as an important aspect of 
good corporate governance. 
Yermack (1996) studies the relation between board size and firm performance for 
firms drawn from Forbes’ rankings of 500 U.S. firms based on sales, total assets, market 
capitalization, and net income during 1984 - 1991.  He measures firm performance using 
Tobin’s Q and finds a negative relation between Tobin’s Q and board size.  To control 
for endogeneity, Yermack also examines whether this result is driven by the presence of 
other governance mechanisms.  He finds that his results are robust to the presence of 
other governance mechanisms like CEO-Chairman separation and the presence of 
blockholders. 
                                                 
5
 California Public Employees Retirement System, Corporate Governance Core Principles and Guidelines 
(1998), available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/principles/domestic/us/page01.asp 
 
6
 Council of Institutional Investors, Shareholder Bill Of Rights (1998)  
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The effectiveness of the board of directors, in particular of outside directors, in 
monitoring managers has been a contentious issue for financial economists.  Existing 
research in this area can broadly be divided into three categories.  The first category 
includes studies of the effect of board composition on firm restructuring.  Weisbach 
(1988) finds that the probability of CEO turnover following poor firm performance is 
higher when outsiders dominate the board.  Brickley, Coles, and Terry (1994) present 
evidence supporting the hypothesis that outside directors vote in the interest of 
shareholders when considering adoptions of poison pills.  Byrd and Hickman (1992) find 
that abnormal returns are much higher when tender offers are announced and outsiders 
dominate the board.  Perry and Shivdasani (2000) document significant improvements in 
operating performance for firms with outsider-dominated boards that initiate 
restructuring.   
 Studies like Bhagat and Black (2001) constitute the second category.  These 
studies analyze wealth effects associated with different board compositions.  Bhagat and 
Black do not find any effect of outside directors on the long-term performance of the 
firm.   
The third category of studies on the effectiveness of boards is related to the 
wealth effects of appointments and resignations of directors.  Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990) study the market reaction to the appointment of outside directors and find a 
significantly positive stock-market reaction to the appointment of an outside director to 
the board.  They consider the appointment of an outside director to the board as a signal 
of increased board activism to control managers’ value reducing actions.  In a similar 
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paper Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find that appointments of insiders on the board 
results in a near zero stock price reaction, signaling no increase in monitoring of the 
managers.  However, they find that markets react positively when an insider with 
ownership level between 5% and 25% joins the board and negatively when an insider 
with ownership level between 0% and 5% joins the board.  They infer that insiders with 
ownership levels between 5% and 25% have their incentives closely aligned with outside 
shareholders whereas an insider with ownership level between 0% and 5% does not. 
Overall, the evidence regarding the effectiveness of board composition on firm 
performance is mixed.  It appears that board independence has significant influence on 
discreet tasks, like poison pills adoption, CEO turnover, etc.  However, in the aggregate, 
it is difficult to isolate the effect of board independence on firm performance. 
Blockholder: Blockholders can influence management primarily in two ways.  
They vote on company resolutions and bring in their own resolutions, or they can sell 
their holdings that will depress the stock price making the firm a more likely takeover 
target.   The evidence on the effect of blockholder on firm value is therefore focused on 
either blockholders influence on some discreet decision or their influence on aggregate 
firm value. 
Jarrell and Poulson (1987) examine the role of ownership structure in takeover 
defense adoptions.  They find that proposals like super- majority or staggered boards are 
adopted by firms with low institutional ownership and high inside ownership.  
Shivdasani (1993) shows that large outside shareholder ownership increases the 
likelihood that a firm is taken over.  Denis and Serrano (1996) show that, if a takeover is 
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defeated, management turnover is higher in poorly performing firms that have 
blockholders.  These studies support the view that large shareholders play an important 
role in corporate governance. 
Even though evidence shows that blockholders support resolutions for improving 
corporate governance, their effect on shareholder wealth is debated.  Wahal (1996) 
studies the efficacy of pension fund activism on the firms targeted by nine major pension 
funds during 1987 and 1993.  He finds evidence for the success of pension funds in 
instituting confidential voting arrangements, changing the structure of the board, and 
redeeming poison pills.  He finds a significant abnormal return around the announcement 
of targeting for a sub-sample of firms subject to nonproxy proposals.  However, he 
reports an absence of any long-term stock or accounting performance improvement after 
these proposals.  He thus concludes that though shareholder activism by large 
shareholders is successful in changing the governance of the target firm, they are 
unsuccessful in increasing the value of the firm.  Karpoff, Malatesta and Walkling 
(1996) also report an absence of any abnormal performance following targeting by 
shareholder activists. 
Smith (1996) examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and 
the effect of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and 
operating performance.  His sample includes 51 firms targeted by CalPERS with 78 
proposals during 1987 – 1993.  He finds that firms targeted by CalPERS were large, had 
poor market-adjusted performance, and high levels of institutional ownership.  More 
than 72% of the targeted firms adopted the proposed governance structure changes.  He 
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reports positive significant returns for targeted firms that subsequently settled with 
CalPERS and negative significant returns for firms that did not settle.  But, in accounting 
terms, he did not find any significant returns when adjusted for industry performance.  
After subtracting the cost of activism by CalPERS he found that activism efforts were 
still beneficial for CalPERS.  He concluded that shareholder activism is largely 
successful in changing governance structures, and when successful, results in 
statistically significant increases in shareholder wealth.   
Overall, the evidence is not clear regarding whether the presence of blockholders 
has any effect on shareholders wealth.  Blockholders may have motivations other than 
stock price maximization.  Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988) examine how different 
kinds of blockholders vote for corporate governance mechanisms.  They find that 
management sponsored anti-takeover amendments receive more support from pressure – 
sensitive institutional investors like insurance companies and less support from pressure- 
resistive institutional investors like money managers.  Woidtke (2002) argues that most 
of the above mentioned studies treat institutional investors as homogenous.  She 
segregates her sample of pension funds into private and public pension funds.  She finds 
that ownership by private pension funds is associated with higher industry adjusted 
Tobin’s Q, whereas ownership by public pension funds is not.  Thus, conclusions 
regarding the effectiveness of blockholders may depend on the motivations of these 
institutions. 
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CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Hypotheses 
Jensen (1993) suggests that a board dominated by independent directors is 
effective in controlling value reducing behavior of managers.  The composition of the 
board of directors, however, is one of many corporate governance mechanisms that may 
work to control these agency costs.  The loss of monitoring resulting from a decrease in 
board independence may be compensated for by other mechanisms, either internal to the 
firm (e.g., insider ownership, managerial compensation, CEO-Chairman separation) or 
external to the firm (e.g., regulated industry, managerial labor market, takeover activity).  
I examine the impact of changes in board independence resulting from director 
resignations while controlling for other governance mechanisms. 
If board independence is an important constituent of a firm’s governance 
structure, changes to it may have an impact on agency costs, which in turn may have a 
bearing on shareholder wealth.  Board structure changes resulting from director 
resignations should therefore bring about some changes in value of stocks. 
H1: Firms undergoing changes in board structure due to director resignations 
experience a nonzero market reaction. 
To test H1, I conduct an event study and measure the market reaction to director 
resignation announcements.  I use standard event time methodology (see section 3.3) to 
measure abnormal returns resulting from these announcements. 
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The market’s perception of board effectiveness can be gauged by the market 
reaction to an alteration in board composition.  Changes in corporate governance that 
result in better monitoring, and thus reduce agency costs, may induce a positive market 
reaction.  Therefore, if an outsider-dominated board is considered superior to an insider- 
dominated board, investors may react negatively to outsider resignations and positively 
to insider resignations.  Assuming no replacement, gray director resignations also result 
in an increase in the proportion of outsiders on the board, and therefore may attract 
positive investor reaction. 
Directors’ resignations may be triggered by their expectations regarding the 
future of the firm.  As argued by Fama (1980), a director’s personal reputation depends 
upon the performance of the firm.  If a director expects poor firm performance, he may 
be inclined to resign from the firm in order to preserve his reputation.  Announcements 
of such resignations acting as signals of poor performance may result in a negative 
average stock price reaction, and may be independent of the type of resigning director.  
H2: The market reaction to director resignations depends on whether the 
outgoing director is an insider, outsider, or gray director. 
To test H2, I conduct an event study on sub-samples defined by the type of 
outgoing director.  Directors who are also employees of the sample firm are identified as 
insiders.  Gray directors are former employees of the firm, relatives of firm employees, 
or directors with significant ties to the firm, such as bankers, accountants, consultants, or 
attorneys of firm.  All other directors are classified as outsiders.  
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Board independence, however, is one of the many governance mechanisms that 
plays a role in controlling the value-reducing behavior of managers.  These governance 
mechanisms may work in such a way that the decrease in the strength of one mechanism 
is compensated for by the presence of other mechanisms.  For example, board 
independence may not be as important for a firm with high non-affiliated block 
ownership as it may be for a firm with low non-affiliated block ownership.  Similarly, 
shareholders can more easily discipline the managers of a firm that belongs to an 
industry with high takeover activity.  Therefore, board independence may not be as 
critical for a firm that belongs to an industry with high takeover activity.  In contrast, if a 
firm follows a compensation policy where managerial compensation is not linked to 
stock performance, board independence may become an important mechanism in 
disciplining the managers. 
H3:  The market reacts more negatively to outside director resignation when 
the strength of other governance mechanisms is low and it reacts more 
positively to insider director resignation when the strength of other 
governance mechanisms is high. 
 To test H3, I create measures of the strength of various corporate governance 
mechanisms.  In order to ascertain the relation between the market reaction to director 
resignations and other governance mechanisms, I regress director resignation event 
abnormal returns on these measures of governance mechanisms.  The construction of 
measures of governance mechanisms and the supporting literature are described below. 
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3.1.1 Internal Mechanisms 
Insider Ownership: Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency problems 
arise with the reduction in managerial ownership of the firm.  Managers bear only a 
partial cost of excess perquisite as managerial ownership decreases, and yet they receive 
all of the benefits of perquisite consumption.  Shareholders sense this increased 
perquisite consumption by managers and are willing to pay less for the ownership.  
Jensen and Meckling therefore, predict a positive monotonic relationship between 
insider ownership and firm value. 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985) and Stulz (1988) argue that high managerial 
stock ownership makes their dismissal much more difficult, and reduces the probability 
of the firm being taken over.  Stulz further suggests that there is a non-linear relationship 
between the fraction of managerial control of voting rights and firm value.  As the 
fraction of votes controlled by managers increases, the probability of takeover decreases 
but the takeover premium increases.  This leads to a non-linear relationship between 
managerial control of voting rights and firm value.  Similarly, Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988) also suggest a non-linear relationship between firm value and managerial 
ownership.  Initially, as managerial ownership increases from zero, managers’ incentives 
become more closely aligned with those of shareholders.  This alignment leads to a 
decrease in agency problems and thus to an increase in firm value.  However, as 
managerial ownership increases beyond a certain level, managers tend to get more 
entrenched and their dismissal becomes more difficult, leading to a decrease in firm 
value. 
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Director resignation represents a shift in board structure.  A resignation by an 
outside director may lead to a decrease in independence of the board if he is replaced by 
an insider or not replaced at all.  Similarly, insider resignations can lead to an increase in 
board independence.  If board independence is effective for controlling agency 
problems, the market should react negatively when independence is decreased and 
positively when independence is increased.  The market reaction to director resignations, 
however, may also depend on other governance variables like insider ownership.  For 
example, board independence may not be crucial for a firm with very high insider 
ownership.  On the other hand a firm with very low insider ownership may find that 
board structure is the most important element of corporate governance.  Therefore, 
market reaction to director resignation may depend on existing insider ownership 
structure or on any number of other existing governance mechanisms.  
I test the relation between the market reaction to director resignation and insider 
ownership using a variable O&D Own that represents the number of common shares 
owned by officers and directors as a percentage of total shares outstanding.  These data 
are collected from Compact Disclosure and company proxy statements. 
Non-Affiliated Blockholder Ownership:  Blockholders who are not affiliated 
with the firm’s management may have better incentives to monitor managers.  Their 
incentives to monitor the firm may further increase as their stock ownership in the firm 
increases.  Blockholders are defined as shareowners with 5% or more ownership in the 
firm.  The variable NonAffi-Blockown measuring the percentage ownership of non-
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affiliated blockholders is used to test the relation between blockholder ownership and 
board independence. 
Managerial Compensation: The interests of managers may be more closely 
aligned with those of shareholders when a larger portion of their compensation is linked 
to stock performance.  Thus, in the presence of high stock-based compensation, board 
structure may not be as important for the firm as it would be for a firm with low stock- 
based compensation.  In other words, high stock-based compensation of managers may 
lead to fewer agency problems, and thus to less need for an independent board.  
To test the relation between managerial compensation and market reaction to 
director resignations I calculate the ratio of restricted stocks and options-based 
compensation to total compensation as a measure for incentive-based compensation.  
Incentive_comp is measured as the fraction of CEO compensation coming from 
restricted stocks and stock options granted in the year prior to resignation.  CEO 
compensation is used as a proxy for overall managerial compensation. 
oncompensati Total
yearprior  in the granted optionsstock  andstock  Restricted of Value
compIncentive_ =  (3.1)
  Data for Incentive_comp are gathered from Standard and Poor’s 
ExecuComp database and are supplemented by data hand collected from proxy 
statements.  I follow Standard and Poor’s method for calculating the values of different 
components of compensation.  The value of restricted stock grants is calculated as the 
number of shares granted multiplied by the closing price on the date of the grant.  The 
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value of stock options is calculated using Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model 
adjusted for continuously paid dividends: 
( ) ( )[ ]2/111 TdKedeSN rTqTtt σ−Φ−Φ× −−     (3.2) 
where Nt is the number of options granted in year t at exercise price K, T is the number 
of years until expiration, r is the average monthly yield on 10-year treasury notes in year 
t, q is the firm’s dividend yield in year t-1, St is the fiscal year closing price, and  is the 
annualized standard deviation of stock returns over the previous sixty months.  (.) is 
the cumulative standard normal distribution, and d1 is defined as 
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 If the expiration date is not specified in the proxy statement, I assume that there 
are ten years remaining until expiration.  If more than one series of options is granted in 
a particular year, I take a weighted average of the strike prices of each of the option 
grants.  Total compensation is the sum of any grants of restricted stocks or stock options, 
base salary, bonus, and any other long-term non-incentive based compensation. 
Board Independence: Resignation by an outside director may raise more 
concern for firms with marginally independent boards than for firms whose directors are 
predominantly outsiders.  To measure this aspect of board structure, I construct two 
variables OutDir Ratio (measuring the percentage of outsiders on board) and Marginal-
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Ind (an indicator variable taking a value of 1 when the firm’s board has 40-60% 
outsiders, 0 otherwise). 
CEO-Chairman Separation: The board of directors’ responsibilities include 
hiring and firing the top managers and structuring their compensation.  The board is 
headed by the Chairman.  When the Chairman and CEO positions are held by the same 
person, the board may not be as effective at monitoring the CEO as it would be if it had 
CEO-Chairman separation.  I create a dummy variable, CEO-Chair that has a value of 0 
if the CEO and Chairman are held by the same person and 1 otherwise. 
Presence of the CEO on the Board Nomination Committee: If the CEO of a 
firm helps determine who is nominated to be a director of the firm, the CEO may prefer 
a director who is friendly to his regime.  As shown by Shivdasani & Yermack (1999), 
the board is less likely to be independent when the CEO serves on the nomination 
committee.  In such cases, the market reaction to outside director resignations is going to 
be more negative because the CEO may nominate a less independent candidate to take 
the departing board member’s place. 
 To test the relation between market reaction to director resignation and the 
presence of the CEO on the board nomination committee, I create a variable CEO-
Nominate that takes a value 1 if the board of the sample firm has a nominating 
committee and the CEO is on the director nomination committee and 0 otherwise. 
 Capital Structure: Higher debt in capital structure may reduce free cash flow 
and thus may reduce agency problems related to free cash flow.  I measure D/V ind-adj 
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as the ratio of a firm’s debt and its total value, adjusted for the mean D/V of firms in the 
same 2-digit SIC industry as the sample firm.  If high debt in the capital structure works 
to reduce agency problem, then the market reaction for highly leveraged firms may be 
less negative than for less levered firms when board independence is decreased. 
3.1.2 External Mechanisms: 
Regulated / Unregulated Dummy: In the case of regulated firms, like utilities 
and financial institutions, managers have less discretion regarding the functioning of the 
firm.  Therefore, board independence may not be as crucial for firms in regulated 
industries as it is for those in unregulated industries.  I test the effect of industry 
regulation on the market reaction to director resignation by creating a variable called 
Regulated that takes a value of 1 if the firm has 49, 60, or 69 as its 2-digit SIC code and 
0 otherwise. 
Institutional Investors Ownership: Institutional investors as a group usually 
have larger stakes in firms than do individual investors.  They also may have better 
means to monitor the managers.  Board independence may not be as important if a firm 
has large institutional ownership.  I create a variable called Instiown that is equal to the 
total percentage ownership of institutional investors as declared in the proxy statement 
of the firm, and use it test the relation between institutional ownership and market 
reaction to director resignation. 
 Takeover Activity: If a firm belongs to an industry group with high takeover 
activity, shareholders may facilitate the removal of inefficient managers by allowing the 
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firm to be taken over.  In this case outside domination of the board may not be as critical 
as it would be for a firm in an industry group with very low takeover activity.  Following 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), I measure Takeover as the fraction of firms acquired over 
the preceding 7 years that belong to the same 2-digit SIC industry as the sample firm. 
Most of the above stated corporate governance mechanisms work in tandem and 
compliment or substitute for each other.  It is therefore imperative to test these 
hypotheses after controlling for different mechanisms in a multivariate setting. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of Director Resignation Announcements by Years and Director Type. 
 
The sample includes the firms for which CRSP data, Compustat data, and proxy statements (on Edgar) no 
more than one year prior to each resignation are available.  The events that are contaminated by other 
significant announcement about the firm over the 3-day period before through the day after the 
announcement of director resignation are also excluded from the sample.  The types of announcements 
used to identify contaminated events are about its earnings, dividends, corporate frauds, top management 
turnover, or merger and acquisition.  Only Non-CEO director resignations are included in the sample.  A 
director is classified as an insider if he/she is an employee of the firm.   Gray directors are former 
employees of the firm, relatives of firm employees, bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the 
firm.   All others are classified as outsiders. 
        
Year Number of Director 
resignations
Number of Inside 
Director resignations
Number of Gray 
Director resignations
Number of Outside 
Director resignations
1990 15 7 3 5
1991 19 8 5 6
1992 13 3 4 6
1993 24 10 5 9
1994 13 4 2 7
1995 31 8 9 14
1996 36 11 10 15
1997 32 12 7 13
1998 42 12 7 23
1999 43 18 6 19
2000 31 11 4 16
Total 299 104 62 133
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3.2 Data 
I use Lexis-Nexis and identify 802 director resignation announcements between 
1990 and 2000.  I begin the sample period in 1990 due to superior proxy statement 
availability beginning in the 1990s.  I eliminate 248 events due to confounding 
announcement occurring on days –3 through +1.  Examples of significant confounding 
events include earnings announcements, dividend announcements, corporate fraud 
revelations, top management turnover, and mergers and acquisitions.  To be included in 
the sample, firms must have data available on CRSP, Compustat, and proxy statements 
(as close as possible to the announcement date, but not exceeding one year prior to the 
event).  These requirements reduce the sample to 299 firm events.  
Table 1 reports the distribution of director resignation announcements by director 
type and by announcement year.  The final six years of the sample period contribute 
72% of the viable events reflecting greater Lexis-Nexis coverage and better proxy 
statement availability in recent years.  Also in Table 1, I show the breakdown of 
resignation announcements by director type.  Directors who are employees of the 
respective sample firms are categorized as insiders.  Gray directors are former employee 
of the firm, relatives of firm employees, and directors with significant ties to the firm 
(such as bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm).  All other directors 
are classified as outsiders.  Using this classification scheme I identify 104 inside, 62 
gray, and 133 outside director resignation announcements. 
 The industry distribution of the sample firms is reported in Table 2.  Compustat 
two-digit SIC codes are used for industry classifications.  The majority of firms (44%) 
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are manufacturing firms (SIC codes 20000 to 3999).  Regulated industries such as banks, 
insurance companies, and utilities comprise about 12% of the sample. 
 
Table 2 
Distribution of Director Resignation Announcements by Industry Type. 
 
The sample includes the firms for which CRSP data, Compustat data, and proxy statements (on Edgar) no 
more than one year prior to each resignation are available.  The events that are contaminated by other 
significant announcement about the firm over the 3-day period before through the day after the 
announcement of director resignation are also excluded from the sample.  The types of announcements 
used to identify contaminated events are about its earnings, dividends, corporate frauds, top management 
turnover, or merger and acquisition.  Only Non-CEO director resignations are included in the sample.  
Compustat SIC codes are used for industry classification. 
       
2-Digit SIC code Industry Name Percentage of Sample
01-09 Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 0.33
10-14 Mining 3.68
15-17 Construction 1.00
20-39 Manufacturing 44.45
40-49 Transportation, Communication, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services 10.35
50-51 Wholesale Trade 4.02
52-59 Retail Trade 6.69
60-67 Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 10.70
70-89 Services 18.73
 
 
The descriptive statistics for the sample (stated in 1995 dollars where applicable) 
are reported in Table 3.  The median age of the sample firm, as determined by the 
number of year the firm is listed on CRSP, at the time of the director resignation is 13 
years.  All firms listed on CRSP have a median age of 6 years during the sampling 
period.  This shows that my sample firms are older than the average firm on CRSP.  
Additionally, the median size of the firms ($379 million) is larger than the median 
Compustat firm size of $106 million measured by total assets.   
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Table 3 
Sample Firm Characteristics. 
 
There are 299 director resignations in the sample during eleven-year 1990-2000 period.  A director is classified as an insider if he/she is an employee of 
the firm.  Gray directors are former employees of the firm, relatives of firm employees, bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm.  All 
other directors are classified as outside directors.  Annual Compustat data are collected at the end of the firm’s fiscal year before the event date.  
Compustat data items are mentioned in parentheses. 
 
Variable Definition All Director Resignations
Inside     Director 
Resignations
 Gray      Director 
Resignations
Outside  Director 
Resignations
Mean 18.44 19.14 17.05 18.54
Median 13.00 14.50 10.5 12.00
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 3953.29 4668.47 1979.63  4314.10
Median 379.08 401.10 335.07 360.62
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 5630.16  6878.09 3093.64 5838.34
Median 559.51 649.84 601.90 491.79
(N) (298) (104) (62) (132)
Mean 2.711 2.831 1.718 3.081
Median 1.841 1.868 1.611 1.928
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean -0.047 -0.029 -0.057 -0.057
Median 0.000 0.009 -0.002 0.000
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean -0.532 -0.140 -0.138 -1.023
Median 0.003 0.010 -0.008 0.002
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean -0.035 -0.299 0.370 -0.018
Median -0.001 0.009 -0.023 -0.003
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean -0.169 -0.154 -0.241 -0.146
Median -0.147 -0.133 -0.191 -0.142
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Firm Age
ROAind
ROEind
M/B
ROBEind
CAR1yr
Size
MV
Market value of firm ($million)  = Market value of equity  
(Data199 * Data25) + Book value of debt (Data181 - 
Data35 +Data10)
Number of years since the firm first apprears on CRSP to 
the date of director resignation announcement
Ratio of net income (Data172) to total assets (Data6), 
adjusted for 3-digit SIC industry median values
Total Assets ($million) (Data6)
Ratio of net income (Data172) to market equity (Data199 * 
Data25), adjusted for 3-digit SIC industry median values
Ratio of market value of equity (Data199 * Data25) to book 
value of equity (Data60)
Ratio of net income (Data172) to book equity (Data60), 
adjusted for 3-digit SIC industry median values
1 Year CAR using equally weighted market index
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The fact that my firms appear to be older and somewhat larger than CRSP and 
Compustat firms in general is not surprising given the sample selection criteria.  
Typically, larger and more well-established firms are the ones that have proxy statement 
data available.  The median market-to-book ratio of the sample is 1.84, comparable to 
median market-to-book ratio of 1.72 for all Compustat firms.  My sample firms under-
perform their peers in terms of both accounting and market-based measures of 
performance.  For example, the mean industry-adjusted return on assets of my firms is  
–4.7%.  The sample firms also have negative 1-year cumulative abnormal returns of 
16.9%. 
Table 3 also provides a breakdown of firm characteristics by director type.  
Comparing medians across these sub-samples reveals that firms with outside director 
resignation are similar to firms whose outgoing director is insider or gray.  For example, 
median size (total assets) of firms with insider resignation is $401 million, which is 
comparable to $335 million for firms with gray director resignations, and $360 million 
for outsider resignations.  The underperformance of the sample firms before the event is 
also similar across sub-samples defined by the type of outgoing director. 
I collect board structure, officer and director ownership, and CEO compensation 
data from proxy statement filed within one year prior of the announcement of director 
resignation.  Spectrum 13F filings are used for institutional ownership data.  Table 4 
presents mean and median values for several governance characteristics of the sample 
firms.  The typical board size of sample firms is eight and on average 55.6% of these are 
outside directors. 
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Table 4 
Sample Firm Governance Structure. 
 
There are 299 director resignations in sample during eleven-year 1990-2000 period.  Only Non-CEO director resignations are included in the sample.  A 
director is classified as an insider if he/she is an employee of the firm.  Gray directors are former employees of the firm, relatives of firm employees, or 
bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm.  All others are classified as outsiders.  Firms without a nominating committee are classified 
as those with CEO as a member of nomination committee.  Firm boards are classified as marginally independent if the percentage of outside directors on 
board is between 40% and 60%.  Stock incentive compensation of CEO includes value of restricted stock and stock option awards.  Firms are 
considered as regulated if their two-digit SIC code is 49, 60, or 69.  Industry takeover activity is defined as the fraction of firms acquired over the 
preceding 7 years that belong to the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm. 
 
Variable Definition All Director 
resignations
Inside   Director 
Resignations
Gray     Director 
Resignations
Outside Director 
Resignations
Mean 17.64 19.58 17.09 16.38
Median 10.30 12.42 9.08 11.70
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 13.50 11.30 13.97 15.01
Median 7.86 6.55 6.70 10.68
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 38.01 39.65 36.84 37.28
Median 37.52 38.39 33.97 37.64
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 9.34 10.36 9.00 8.70
Median 8 9 8 8
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.545 0.615 0.452 0.534
Median − − − −
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.540 0.491 0.476 0.608
Median 0.556 0.500 0.500 0.625
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Fraction of firms with staggered board
Fraction of the board that are outside directors
Fraction of common stocks owned by officers and directors of 
the firm
Fraction of common stocks owned by Non-affiliated 
blockholders of the firm
Fraction of common stocks owned by institutional investors
Board size of the firm
Staggered
OutDir Ratio
O&D Own
NonAffi-BlockOwn
Instiown
Board Size
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Table 4. (Continued) 
Variable Definition All Director 
resignations
Inside  Director 
Resignations
Gray     Director 
Resignations
Outside Director 
Resignations
Mean 0.395 0.500 0.290 0.361
Median − − − −
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.716 0.798 0694 0.662
Median − − − −
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.726 0.750 0.839 0.655
Median − − − −
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 2,074,413 1,613,792 1,522,839 2,691,723
Median 743,729 746,367 633,027 775,943
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.283 0.264 0.278 0.300
Median 0.156 0.156 0.155 0.176
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.225 0.244 0.188 0.227
Median 0.142 0.173 0.089 0.146
(N) (298) (104) (62) (132)
Mean 0.076 0.080 0.053 0.084
Median 0.013 0.020 -0.001 0.019
(N) (298) (104) (62) (132)
Mean 0.120 0.125 0.130 0.113
Median − − − −
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Mean 0.216 0.226 0.201 0.215
Median 0.205 0.210 0.204 0.207
(N) (299) (104) (62) (133)
Takeover
Incentive-Comp
D/V
D/V ind-adj
Regulated
Marginal-Ind
CEO-Chair
CEO-Nominate
Comp
=1 if the firm's board has 40%-60% outside directors, 0 
otherwise
=1 if the firm's CEO is also the Chairman of the board, 0 
otherwise
=1 if the firm does not have a nominating committee or if the 
CEO is the member of nominating committee, 0 otherwise
Total Compensation of CEO
Fraction of firms acquired over the preceding seven year that 
belong to the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm
Ratio of CEO stock based compensation to his total 
compensation
Ratio of Long-term debt to total market value of the firm
Industry adjusted ratio of Long-term debt to market value of the 
firm
=1 if the the firm's two-digit SIC code is 49, 60, or 69, 0 
otherwise
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Outside representation on the board for the sample is slightly higher than the 45.6% 
reported by Shivdasani and Yermack (1999).  This is consistent with Huson, Parrino, 
and Starks (2001) finding of a trend of increasing board independence over time.  
Specifically, my sample period extends from 1990 to 2000 (with a majority in the later 
half of the sample period), whereas Shivdasani and Yermack’s sample is drawn only 
from 1994. 
In Table 4 I show that roughly 54.5% of the sample has staggered boards.  
Marginally independent boards, those with 40% - 60% outside directors, are identified as 
having Marginal-Ind (a dummy variable) that is set to 1.  I find that 39.5% of my firms 
have marginally independent boards.  Higher rates of insider resignations for firms with 
marginally independent boards result in increases in board independence.  Of the firms 
with insider resignations, 50% have Marginal-Ind equal to 1.  I also show that the 
majority of firms have CEOs as Chairmen of the board, and that the CEO is a member of 
the board nominating committee.  Combining the CEO and Chairman positions and 
having the CEO sit on the nominating committee indicate less independence of the 
board, all else equal. 
I use officer and director ownership, non-affiliated large block (greater then 5%) 
ownership, and institutional ownership as measures of firm ownership structure.  As 
shown in Table 4 mean (median) officer and director ownership of the firms is 17.6% 
(10.3%) which is slightly lower than 21.1% (14.4%) reported by Holderness, Kroszner 
and Sheehan (1999).  My sample firms are larger than those examined by Holderness, 
Kroszner, and Sheehan which may explain the relatively lower officer and director 
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ownership.  Non-affiliated block owners hold a mean of about 13.5% (median of 7.6%) 
and institutional owners hold a mean of about 38.0% (median of 37.5%) of the firms’ 
shares.  The distribution of these ownership variables is similar across sub-samples 
based on director type. 
Table 4 reveals that mean (median) CEO compensation is $2.074 million 
($743,729) in 1995 U.S. dollars.  CEOs in my sample earn a mean of 28.3% (median of 
15.6%) of their total compensation in form of stock incentives.7 The percentage of 
incentive-based CEO pay is similar across the three sub-samples. 
The market for corporate control is considered the governance characteristic of 
last resort.  If a firm is in an industry with significant take over activity, other 
governance mechanisms may lose some of their importance.  Following Agarwal and 
Knoeber (1996) I compute for each sample firm an industry-specific probability of take 
over.  The probability is calculated using 2-digit SIC codes and is defined as the fraction 
of firms acquired over the preceding seven years that belong to the same 2-digit SIC 
industry as the sample firm.  I find that on average 21.6% of firms within my firms’ 2-
digit SIC industry are acquired over the seven year period before the event.  Agarwal 
and Knoeber report a 27% probability of acquisition for NYSE firms from 1981-1987. 
3.3 Methodology 
I capture the market’s perception of the importance of director resignations using 
standard event study methodology.  The announcement date (AD) is defined as the date 
                                                 
7
 Hall and Murphy (2000) report a rise in S&P 500 CEOs’ incentive compensation from 21% of total 
compensation in 1992 to 47% in 1999.  
  
48 
the announcement appears on the Lexis-Nexis database.  I use the market model method 
to obtain abnormal returns using a 180-trading day (AD – 201, AD – 20) estimation 
period and the CRSP value weighted index as the market index.  Firms must have 
returns for at least 150 trading days before the announcement day to be included in the 
sample. 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use a unique way to rate the firm’s 
governance structure.  They construct a governance index (GIM Index) as a proxy for the 
degree of shareholder rights by counting the number of takeover defenses and 
restrictions on shareholder rights adopted by firms.  There are only 79 firms in my 
sample that have the GIM Index available.  Therefore, I construct an alternative 
Corporate Governance Index (CGI) representing the overall strength of each firm’s 
governance structure.  CGI is constructed using governance variables like capital 
structure, ownership, CEO compensation, board structure, and takeover activity in firm’s 
industry.  
The exact construction of CGI as discussed in the next few paragraphs is given in 
Table 5.  Debt may reduce free cash flows and thus help alleviate agency problem.  
Firms with debt ratios greater than its industry average get a score of 1, otherwise the 
score is -1.  Incentive compensation may be used to align managerial interest with those 
of shareholders.  However, as recognized by Erickson, Hanlon and Maydew (2004), very 
high levels of stock based compensations may create incentives for managers to commit 
accounting fraud.  I therefore, give a score of -1 to firms in the bottom or the top 1/3 of 
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my sample sorted by the ratio of CEO stock-based compensation to total compensation.  
Otherwise the score is 1. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) show a piecewise linear relation between 
managerial ownership and market valuation.  They demonstrate a decreasing relation 
when managerial ownership is less than 5% or greater than 25%, and an increasing 
relation when managerial ownership is between 5% and 25%.  Following their evidence, 
I assign a score of 1 for firms with officer and director ownership between 5% and 25%, 
and score of -1 otherwise.  Non-affiliated blockholders and institutional holders may 
exercise influence if they have higher stockholdings.  In the absence of well-specified 
guidelines regarding the size of block ownership needed to wield influence, I use a cut-
off of 10%.  Firms with Institutional ownership greater than 10% get a score of 1, 
otherwise the score is -1.  Non-affiliated block ownership is treated in the same way as 
institutional ownership. 
Firms get a score of -1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board, and 1 
otherwise.  Similarly firms without a nominating committee and firms with the CEO as a 
member of the nominating committee get scores of -1, and all other firms get scores of 1.  
To capture the importance of board independence, I assign a score of 1 when firms have 
more than 50% outsiders on the board and -1 otherwise.  Firms with high industry 
takeover activity are assigned a score of 1, and others are assigned a score of -1. 
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Table 5 
Construction of Corporate Governance Index. 
 
Variable# Condition Score Mean Standard Deviation
D/V ind-adj <0 -1
D/V ind-adj >=0 1
Incentive-comp Bottom 1/3 -1
Incentive-comp Middle 1/3 1
Incentive-comp Top 1/3 -1
O&D own <=5% -1
O&D own 5% < O&Down < 25% 1
O&D own >=25% -1
NonAffi-BlockOwn < 10% -1
NonAffi-BlockOwn >= 10% 1
Instiown < 10% -1
Instiown >= 10% 1
CEO-Chair =1 -1
CEO-Chair =0 1
CEOnominate =1 -1
CEOnominate =0 1
OutDir ratio < 50% -1
OutDir ratio >= 50% 1
Takeover Bottom 1/2 -1
Takeover Top 1/2 1
CGI 0.185 2.940
0.141 0.992
-0.324 0.948
0.081 0.998
0.311 0.992
0.632 0.776
-0.431 0.904
-0.030 1.001
-0.452 0.894
0.262 0.967
 
#
 The variables are defined as follows: 
 
O&D own  = Fraction of common stocks owned by officers and directors of the firm. 
NonAffi-BlockOwn = Fraction of common stocks owned by non-affiliated blockholders of the firm. 
Instiown   = Fraction of common stocks owned by institutional investors 
Inventive-Comp  = Ratio of CEO stock based compensation to his total compensation. 
OutDir Ratio  = Fraction of the board that are outside directors. 
CEO-Chair  = 1 if the firm’s CEO is also the Chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. 
CEO-Nominate = 1 if the firm does not have a nominating committee or if the CEO is a 
member of the nominating committee, 0 otherwise. 
D/V ind-adj  = Industry adjusted ratio of long-term debt to market value of the firm. 
Takeover = Fraction of firms acquired over the preceding 7 years that belong to the same 
two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm. 
CGI = Firm’s corporate governance index measured as the sum of scores for above 
listed governance variables. 
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The Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is calculated by accumulating the scores 
from the different governance variables.  The exact construction is given in Table 5.  CGI for 
my sample firms has a mean of 0.185 and a standard deviation of 2.94, suggesting that CGI for 
sample firms have good amount of variation.  I also consider other methods of constructing 
the corporate governance indices by excluding some of the above stated governance 
variables.  The results are robust as long as the ownership and compensation variables 
are included.  Results also hold for CGIs based on different break-points for allocating 
scores for governance variables. 
The following regression model is used to determine the significance of the 
corporate governance index in determining the market reaction to director resignations: 
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Where CARf is the event study three-day abnormal return around the director resignation 
announcement for firm f.  Dout, and Din are indicators for outside and inside director 
resignation respectively.  The following tests are performed to provide statistical 
inferences regarding the effect of the corporate governance index (CGI) on 
announcement period returns for director resignations: 
Outside director resignation:  0:0 =+ cgioutgH ββ  
Inside director resignation:  0:0 =+ cgiingH ββ  
Gray director resignation:  0:0 =cgiH β  
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 Multivariate Analysis: I perform multivariate regression analysis to evaluate the 
effect of firms’ existing governance structures on market perceptions of changes in 
board independence.  The following specifications are used for these tests: 
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Where CARf is define as in 3.4, and Dout, and Din are indicators for outside and inside 
director resignation respectively.  GV is a set of g corporate governance variables.  CV is 
a set of c control variables.  For this specification I control for firm age, size as measured 
by log of total assets, industry-adjusted return on equity, and past stock performance.  
The following tests are conducted to examine the effect of governance variables on the 
market reaction to director resignations: 
Outside director resignation:  0:0 =+ goutgH ββ  
Inside director resignation:  0:0 =+ gingH ββ  
 Gray director resignation:  0:0 =gH β  
 I control for firm age because firms may require different levels of board 
oversight depending upon their age.  However, the exact effect of age on the importance 
of board independence is not clear.  One can argue that younger firms may require more 
board oversight because they may not have other mechanisms in place.  Similar 
argument can also be made for more matured firms as they may have more free cash-
flow.  Agency costs in larger firms may be less susceptible to change in board 
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independence as larger firms are more closely followed by analysts.  A firm’s past 
performance may also affect the market reaction to a director resignation because firms 
with deteriorating performance may require more board oversight.  I thus include firm 
age, size (as measured by log of total assets), industry-adjusted return on equity, and past 
stock performance to control for the above stated effects. 
  
54 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of the tests of the hypotheses described in 
Chapter III. The first section discusses the event-study results. Multivariate test results 
are described in the second and third sections of this chapter.  A conclusion of the results 
is found in the last section. 
4.1 Market Reaction to Director Resignation 
 Investor reaction to director resignations is reported in Table 6.  Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) are based on the market model and use a CRSP value weighted 
market index.  To isolate investor reaction to an event, it is crucial to know when the 
relevant information is available to the market.  The newswire sources do not capture the 
exact time of the resignation, and announcements are sometimes made after the close of 
the major stock markets.  In order to overcome the ambiguity regarding the timing of the 
announcement I consider three windows (-1, 0), (0, 1), and (-1, 1) for the event study 
analysis.  Market model parameters are calculated using 180-trading day returns prior to 
the event.  To increase the reliability of the estimate, I require firms to have at least 150 
days of returns data before the event.  I also estimate CARs with different parameter 
estimation periods and simple market-adjusted returns to control for biases introduced by 
market model parameters.  Sine the results are robust to event study model specifications 
and parameter estimation periods, I report only those based on the market model. 
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Table 6 
Announcement Period Abnormal Returns for Director Resignations. 
 
Two-day and three-day cumulative abnormal returns associated with announcements of 299 director 
resignations over eleven years (1990-2000). The events that are contaminated by other significant 
announcement about the firm over the 3-day period before through the day after the announcement of 
director resignation are also excluded from the sample. Firms are classified as regulated if their two-digit 
SIC code is 49, 60, or 69. CRSP value-weighted index is used to calculate abnormal returns. Market model 
parameters are calculated using 180 trading-days data prior to the event. p-values are reported in 
parentheses from two-tailed test using z-scores for Mean CAR, and t-test for difference in mean. 
 
 
Mean CAR Positive : Negative Mean CAR Positive : Negative
(-1,0)    -0.55%* 137:162 -0.69%** 117:146
(0.06) (0.02)
(0,+1)      -0.78%** 132:167 -0.86%*** 116:147
(0.02) (0.01)
(-1,+1)       -1.18%*** 129:170 -1.33%*** 109:154
(0.00) (0.00)
(-1,0) -0.63% 42:62 -0.65% 39:52
(0.16) (0.24)
(0,+1) -0.17% 46:58 -0.02% 42:49
(0.68) (0.73)
(-1,+1)    -1.17%** 41:63 -1.03%* 37:54
(0.05) (0.09)
(-1,0) 0.70% 36:26 0.62% 29:25
(0.38) (0.79)
(0,+1)     -0.93%** 24:38 -1.00%** 21:33
(0.04) (0.05)
(-1,+1) 0.02% 31:31 -0.12% 25:29
(0.71) (0.41)
(-1,0)    -1.07%** 59:74 -1.32%*** 49:69
(0.03) (0.01)
(0,+1) -1.20% 62:71 -1.44%** 53:65
(0.11) (0.03)
(-1,+1)    -1.74%** 57:76 -2.12%*** 47:71
(0.02) (0.00)
Gray director resignations (N = 54)
Outside director resignations (N = 118)
Panel A. Mean CAR
Event 
Window
All Firms
Gray director resignations (N = 62)
Outside director resignations (N = 133)
Non-regulated Firms
All director resignations (N = 299)
Inside director resignations (N = 104)
All director resignations (N = 263)
Inside director resignations (N = 91)
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Event 
Window Outside - Inside Outside - Gray Inside - Gray Outside - Inside Outside - Gray Inside - Gray
(-1,0) -0.44%   -1.77%** -1.33% -0.67% -1.94%** -1.27%
(0.54) (0.04) (0.11) (0.42) (0.05) (0.18)
(0,+1) -1.03% -0.27% 0.76% -1.42% -0.44% 0.98%
(0.31) (0.80) (0.42) (0.20) (0.72) (0.33)
(-1,+1) -0.57% -1.76% -1.19% -1.09% -2.00% -0.91%
(0.60) (0.13) (0.26) (0.36) (0.13) (0.44)
Panel B. Test for difference in mean CARs
All Firms Non-regulated firms
 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the mean CAR for all director resignations as well as 
for each type of resigning director.  Investor reactions for the sub-sample of non-
regulated firms are also reported.  Sample firms on average lose about 1.18% of their 
market value during the 3-day window around the day of announcement.  The market 
reaction is stronger for non-regulated firms that lose about 1.33% of their market value 
during the same period.  CARs for (-1,0) and for (0, +1) are also negative and statistically 
significant.  These results clearly establish the importance of director resignations as 
perceived by investors, suggesting that board structure changes have an impact on firm 
value.  The result is also consistent with H1, which states that firms undergoing changes 
in board structure due to director resignations experience a nonzero market reaction. 
 To gauge the relative importance of each type of director resignation, I evaluate 
CARs for subgroups defined by director type.  As revealed by the CARs for each 
window, the market reaction to director resignations is strongest when an outside 
director resigns.  Sample firms suffer a 1.74% decline in market value during the three-
day (-1, 1) event window when an outside director resigns.  Rosenstein and Wyatt 
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(1990) find a 0.22% positive market reaction to outside director appointment, suggesting 
that investors are more concerned with outsider resignations than their appointments.  
The market reaction to insider resignations is -1.17%, and to gray director resignations is 
insignificant during the (-1, 1) event window.  Further examination of other event 
windows demonstrates the significance of outside director resignation when compared 
with insider or gray director resignations. Event window (-1, 1) shows that event returns 
are significantly different from zero only for outside directors. For firms operating in 
non-regulated industries, the market reaction to outsider resignations is even more 
pronounced.  Non-regulated firms lose about 2.12% of their market value with outside 
director resignation, whereas the fall in market value for firm facing insider resignations 
is only 1.03%. 
Panel B of Table 6 reports test of differences in mean CARs for each type of 
resigning director.  Even though the magnitudes of market reaction are different for 
different director types, the means are not statistically different. The insignificant 
difference in means is inconsistent with H2.  This evidence is puzzling because it 
suggests that investors react to board changes rather than to losses or gains in board 
independence. 
The univariate statistics reported in Table 6 hide much of the variation in the 
CARs.  Some of this variation is captured in the ratio of number of firms facing positive 
versus negative reactions.  It is interesting to note that the proportion of firms suffering a 
negative market reaction for outsider resignations is much higher than the proportion of 
firms suffering a negative market reaction when other kinds of directors resign.  A larger 
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market reaction to outsider resignation indicates investor concern regarding board 
independence.  However, negative market reactions are observed for insider and gray 
director resignations as well.   
Another possible explanation for similar investor reactions to all types of director 
resignations is that investors anticipate worsening performance of these firms. Fama 
(1980) argues that a director’s reputation depends on the firm performance.  Directors 
may try to save their reputations by resigning from boards of firms with anticipated poor 
performance.  One can thus argue that the investor reaction to director resignations is 
related to firm performance rather than to the change in board structure. 
Along with board independence there are many other mechanisms available to 
improve a firm’s governance.  If other governance mechanisms are quite strong, 
investors may be less concerned over a loss in board independence, and vice versa.  
However, if investor reaction to director resignations is only due to a signal about a 
firm’s deteriorating condition and not about the concerns regarding a loss or gain in 
board independence, the CARs should be unrelated to the existing governance structure.  
Therefore, differences in CARs across firms facing similar types of director resignations 
may insinuate that investors do not evaluate board structures in isolation.  Investors may 
judge the value of changes in board structure in light of the strength of existing 
governance structures.  In particular, some governance mechanisms may act as 
substitutes for board independence.  I address these issues next by examining the market 
reactions in a multivariate setting. 
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4.2 Market Reaction and Corporate Governance Index 
 To ascertain whether the market response to director resignations has any relation 
to firms existing governance structures, I regress the CARs on a corporate governance 
index and dummy variables indicating the type of outgoing director.  If the director 
resignation is simply a signal about the firm’s worsening performance, the market 
response to this change in board independence should be unrelated to the existing 
governance structure.  However, if investors believe that a change in the board may 
affect shareholder protection, they may react more strongly to a loss in board 
independence for firms with weak governance.  
The corporate governance index (CGI) represents the overall strength of each 
firm’s governance characteristics.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) use a governance 
index measuring the number of takeover deterrent that a firm has.  They find that firm’s 
Tobin’s Q is related to their governance index.  My measure of governance index (CGI) 
is based on many governance aspects of the firm.  Specifically, CGI is constructed using 
governance variables such as ownership, CEO compensation, board structure, capital 
structure, and takeover activity in each firm’s industry.  The exact construction is given 
in Table 5.  
Table 7 reports OLS regression coefficients for models regressing the three-day 
CAR on each firm’s CGI (equation 3.4).  To isolate the influence of CGI on the market 
response to each type of director resignation, I interact CGI with indicator variables for 
director type (Din and Dout represent inside and outside directors respectively).   
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The effect of CGI on the market response to gray director resignations is captured by 
cgi.  Panel B of Table 7 reports the effect of CGI on CAR for inside and outside 
directors, and is revealed by (ing + cgi) and (outg + cgi) respectively.  
 
Table 7 
OLS Regression Estimates of Three-day CAR on Firm’s Corporate Governance Index (CGI).  
 
There are 299 director resignations in sample during eleven-year 1990-2000 period. Only Non-CEO 
director resignations are included in the sample. A director is classified as an insider if he/she is an 
employee of the firm.  Gray directors are former employees of the firm, relatives of firm employees, 
bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm.  All others are classified as outsiders.  The 
regression can be described in the following model: 
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Panel A. Regression estimates
Coeff Coeff
Constant -0.012 -0.005
Din -0.013 -0.007
Dout -0.020 -0.021
CGI -0.004 -0.005
Din * CGI 0.006 0.007
Dout * CGI 0.009** 0.010**
Firm Age -0.001 -0.001
Ln Size 0.004 0.003
CAR1yr 0.023*** 0.031***
adj-R2 0.042 0.049
Number of Obs 296 261
Prob>F (test for joint significance) 0.01 0.01
Panel B. Joint Tests
CGI + Din*CGI 0.002 0.002
CGI + Dout*CGI 0.005** 0.005**
Non-regulated firms
Variables#
All Firms
 
     ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
 
# The variables are defined as follows 
CARf is three-day event return around director resignation announcement for firm f. 
Din is indicator for inside director resignation 
Dout is indicator for outside director resignation 
CGI is firm’s corporate governance index  
Ln Size   = Logarithm of total assets of the firm. 
ROE ind-adj  = Industry adjusted ratio of net income to market value of equity. 
CAR1yr   = One-year CAR using value weighted market index. 
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A significant coefficient estimate for the interaction variable for Dout and CGI is 
consistent with the notion that the market reaction to a loss of board independence 
depends on the strength of the firm’s corporate governance.  The total effect of CGI on 
CAR for outsider resignations is 0.005 (reported in panel B).  Standardizing this 
coefficient by multiplying by the standard deviation of CGI and dividing by the standard 
deviation of CAR for firms with outsider resignation yields a coefficient of 0.16.  This 
implies that holding everything else constant, a firm with CGI one standard deviation 
higher than the sample mean (i.e. CGI of 3.29) suffers a 0.16 standard deviation less 
negative event-return than the sample mean return (i.e. -0.18% return as compared to a 
sample mean return of -1.74%).  This suggests that firms with high CGI suffer a much 
less negative investor reaction than a firm with low CGI when an outsider resigns.  The 
regression coefficients for CGI and Din*CGI are not significantly different from zero, 
suggesting that CGI has little influence on investor response to inside or gray director 
resignation.  Similar relations between CGI and CAR are observed for the sample 
excluding regulated firms.   
The relation between CAR and CGI is robust to inclusion of past stock 
performance in the model specification (see Table 7).  Therefore, it also addresses the 
concern raised in the previous section that investor reaction to director resignation is 
only due to the concern of deteriorating performance, and not because of the concern for 
loss in board independence.  The positive regression coefficient of one-year cumulative 
returns (CAR1yr) suggests positive association between event returns and past stock 
performance.  It indicates that investors are more concerned about director resignations 
  
62 
for firms that have underperformed in the past.  Combining this piece of evidence with 
the evidence a of positive association between CAR and CGI for outsider resignation 
illustrates that, controlling for past performance, investors react more negatively to a loss 
in board independence especially when the firm has weaker governance.   
The above evidence is consistent with the idea that investor reaction is less 
negative when firms with outside director resignations have strong overall governance, 
and other governance mechanism may work as substitutes for board independence.  It is 
also consistent with H3, which states that the market reacts more negatively to outside 
director resignation when the strength of other governance mechanisms is low. 
The relation between CGI and CAR for outsider resignation suggests that other 
governance mechanisms may act as substitutes for loss in board independence.  Some 
governance mechanisms may be better substitutes for board independence than others.  
The CGI is a composite index and it may conceal the relative importance of individual 
governance variables.  Next, I evaluate different governance mechanisms for their ability 
to substitute for board independence as a means of protecting shareholder interests. 
4.3 Multivariate Analysis 
 To identify governance mechanisms that are potential substitutes for board 
independence, I regress CAR on individual governance variables (equation 3.5).  The 
OLS regression results are reported in Table 8.  The effect of each governance 
mechanism on CAR for each type of director resignation is captured by interacting Din 
and Dout with each governance mechanism.  The coefficients g, ing + g, and outg + g 
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capture the influence of each governance variable on CAR when the outgoing director is 
a gray, insider, or outsider respectively.  The models reported in this Table also control 
for other factors like firm age, size, and past performance that may influence investor 
reactions.  Model 1 reports coefficient estimates for all governance variables considered.  
As F-test for model 1 rejects the joint significance of the governance variables taken 
together, I include those variables in models 2, 3, and 4 that are statistically significant in 
some cases. 
Consistent with the CGI regression results, I find that officer and director 
ownership (O&D own), non-affiliated block ownership (NonAffi-Blockown), and CEO 
incentive-compensation (Incentive-Comp) are related to CAR for outside director 
resignations.  None of the governance variables shows any significance for insider or 
gray director resignations.  O&D own, and NonAffi-Blockown also show a non-linear 
relation with CAR.  In particular, O&D own is negatively related with CAR and square of 
O&D own is positively related with CAR.  This is consistent with Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny’s (1988) findings of a nonlinear relation between firm value and insider 
ownership.  Investors react more negatively to outside director resignation when firm’s 
officers and directors have small ownership.  However, investor reaction is less negative 
for firms with higher levels of O&D ownership.  This relation between O&D own and 
CAR suggests that board independence is more valuable for shareholders at lower levels 
of insider ownership.  When O&D ownership is high, the incentives of managers are 
closely aligned to those of shareholders and investors show less concern for the lost 
board independence. 
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Table 8 
OLS Regression Estimates of Three-day CAR on Firm Characteristics. 
 
There are 299 director resignations in sample during eleven-year 1990-2000 period. Only Non-CEO director resignations are included in the sample. A 
director is classified as an insider if he/she is an employee of the firm. Gray directors are former employees of the firm, relatives of firm employees, 
bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm. All others are classified as outsiders. The regression can be described in the following model: 
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Co-eff ing+g outg+g Co-eff ing+g outg+g Co-eff ing+g outg+g Co-eff ing+g outg+g
Constant -0.038 -0.045 -0.025 -0.031
Din 0.058 0.020 0.047 0.002 0.012 -0.013 -0.004 -0.035
Dout -0.053 -0.091* -0.026 -0.071* -0.028 -0.053 0.002 -0.029
O&D own 0.354 -0.208 -0.258** 0.287 -0.201 -0.262** 0.280 -0.191 -0.246** 0.287 -0.147 -0.258**
O&D own2 -0.537 0.278 0.367** -0.439 0.268 0.380** -0.424 0.276 0.352** -0.435 0.231 0.360**
NonAffi-BlockOwn 0.000 0.209 0.353** 0.050 0.223 0.340** 0.030 0.211 0.332** 0.019 0.186 0.319**
NonAffi-BlockOwn2 0.008 -0.302 -0.481* -0.082 -0.324 -0.470* -0.055 -0.243 -0.480* -0.047 -0.229 -0.449*
Instiown 0.004 -0.190 0.093 0.006 -0.161 0.097 -0.076 -0.017 0.055* -0.068 -0.011 -0.038
Instiown2 -0.104 0.211 -0.206* -0.109 0.170 -0.206*
Incentive-Comp 0.019 -0.053* -0.053** 0.022 -0.047 -0.056** 0.013 -0.043 -0.058*** 0.014 -0.041 -0.051**
OutDir Ratio -0.004 -0.030 0.045 -0.016 -0.037 0.039 -0.014 -0.047 0.048
Marginal-Ind 0.015 -0.006 0.008
CEO-Chair -0.011 -0.024 0.009
CEO-Nominate -0.021 -0.005 -0.005
D/V ind-adj -0.025 0.029 -0.032 -0.018 0.018 -0.035 -0.023 0.018 -0.028
Regulated -0.008 -0.048* -0.004 -0.006 -0.035 -0.006
Takeover 0.057 0.063 0.064
Firm Age -0.001 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001
Ln Size 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.007**
ROE ind - adj 0.004
CAR1yr 0.028*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.021**
adj-R2 0.031 0.0631 0.0613 0.0544
Number of Obs 297 297 297 298
0.19 0.03 0.02 0.02
Model 1
Prob>F (test for joint 
significance)
Model 4Model 3
Variables#
Model 2
    
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
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Table 8 (continued) 
#
 The variables are defined as follows: 
CARf is three-day event return around director resignation announcement for firm f. 
Din is indicator for inside director resignation 
Dout is indicator for outside director resignation 
GV is a set of firm’s (G) governance variables 
CV is a set of firm’s (C) control variables 
 
Governance Variables: 
 
O&D own  = Fraction of common stocks owned by officers and directors of the firm. 
O&D own2  = Squared (O&D own). 
NonAffi-BlockOwn = Fraction of common stocks owned by non-affiliated blockholders of the firm. 
NonAffi-BlockOwn2 = Squared (NonAffi-BlockOwn). 
Instiown   = Fraction of common stocks owned by institutional investors 
Instiown 2  = Squared (Instiown) 
Inventive-Comp  = Ratio of CEO stock based compensation to his total compensation. 
OutDir Ratio  = Fraction of the board that are outside directors. 
Marginal-Ind  = 1 if the firm’s board has 40% - 60% outside directors, 0 otherwise. 
CEO-Chair  = 1 if the firm’s CEO is also the Chairman of the board, 0 otherwise. 
CEO-Nominate = 1 if the firm does not have a nominating committee or if the CEO is a member of the nominating committee, 0 
otherwise. 
D/V ind-adj  = Industry adjusted ratio of long-term debt to market value of the firm. 
Regulated  = 1 if the firm’s two-digit SIC code is 49, 60, or 69, 0 otherwise. 
Takeover = Fraction of firms acquired over the preceding 7 years that belong to the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample 
firm. 
 
Control Variables: 
 
Firm Age  = Number of years since the firm first apprears on CRSP to the date of director resignation announcement. 
Ln Size   = Logarithm of total assets of the firm. 
ROE ind-adj  = 3-digit SIC Industry adjusted ratio of net income to market value of equity. 
CAR1yr   = One-year CAR using value weighted market index 
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The positive coefficient of NonAffi-Blockown for outsider resignations is 
consistent with non-affiliated blockholders providing a monitoring function for the firm.  
Economically, the event returns for outsider resignation are higher (or less negative) by 
3.4% (from model 2) when there is a 10% increase in non-affiliated block ownership.  
This relationship turns negative for very high non-affiliated block ownership, suggesting 
that at such high levels, increasing non-affiliated block ownership does not add value as 
a corporate governance mechanism.  This result is consistent with the hypothesis that 
non-affiliated block ownership works as a substitute for board independence. 
Firms that reward their CEOs with more stock-based compensation suffer a more 
negative market response for outsider resignations.  A negative coefficient of -0.056 for 
Incentive-comp in model 2 indicates that for every 10% increase in incentive 
compensation, event returns for firms with outsider resignations are lower by 0.56%.  
This is contrary to the standard belief that higher incentive compensation for CEOs leads 
to better corporate governance.  However, as shown by Erickson, Hanlon, and Maydew 
(2004), the possibility of corporate fraud is an increasing function of the CEO’s 
incentive compensation.  The findings reported in Table 8 are consistent with incentive 
compensation at very high levels exacerbating the agency problem rather than being a 
potential mitigating factor. 
The above results hold after controlling for firm age, size, and past performance.  
Firm size (measured by log of total assets) and past stock performance (measured by one 
year cumulative abnormal returns before the event) are positively related to CAR 
suggesting that larger firms and firms that outperform the market face less erosion in 
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value when outsiders resign.  Firm age and accounting return appear to be unrelated to 
investor reaction to director resignations. 
As a robustness check, I also run similar regression models for non-regulated 
firms only.  These results are reported in Table 9.  Results similar to those reported in 
Table 8 for all firms are observed for this sample also. 
 
 
Table 9 
OLS Regression Estimates of Three-day CAR on Firm Characteristics for Non-Regulated Firms. 
 
There are 262 director resignations in sample for non-regulated firms during eleven-year 1990-2000 
period. Only Non-CEO director resignations are included in the sample. A director is classified as an 
insider if he/she is an employee of the firm.  Gray directors are former employees of the firm, relatives of 
firm employees, bankers, accountants, consultants, or attorneys of the firm.  All others are classified as 
outsiders. Firms are classified as regulated if their two-digit SIC code is 49, 60, or 69. 
The regression can be described in the following model: 
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Co-eff ing+g outg+g Co-eff ing+g outg+g
Constant -0.027 -0.021
Din 0.000 -0.027 0.024 0.003
Dout -0.005 -0.032 -0.025 -0.047
O&D own 0.285 -0.119 -0.269** 0.273 -0.169 -0.243*
O&D own2 -0.443 0.190 0.370** -0.423 0.248 0.344**
NonAffi-BlockOwn 0.019 0.151 0.463*** 0.028 0.155 0.421***
NonAffi-BlockOwn2 -0.034 -0.153 -0.707** -0.047 -0.138 -0.635**
Instiown -0.085* -0.031 -0.060 -0.092* -0.036 -0.065*
Incentive-Comp 0.007 -0.052 -0.060** 0.010 -0.051 -0.066***
OutDir Ratio -0.010 -0.056 0.033
D/V ind-adj -0.031 -0.002 -0.043
Firm Age -0.001* -0.001*
Ln Size 0.010*** 0.010***
CAR1yr 0.034*** 0.033***
adj-R2 0.0823 0.0699
Number of Obs 262 262
0.00 0.02Prob>F (test for joint significance)
Model 1 Model 2
Variables#
  
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. 
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Table 9 (continued) 
#
 The variables are defined as follows: 
CARf is three-day event return around director resignation announcement for firm f. 
Din is indicator for inside director resignation 
Dout is indicator for outside director resignation 
GV is a set of firm’s (G) governance variables 
CV is a set of firm’s (C) control variables 
 
Governance Variables: 
 
O&D own = Fraction of common stocks owned by officers and directors of the 
firm. 
O&D own2  = Squared (O&D own). 
NonAffi-BlockOwn = Fraction of common stocks owned by non-affiliated blockholders of 
the firm. 
NonAffi-BlockOwn2 = Squared (NonAffi-BlockOwn). 
Instiown   = Fraction of common stocks owned by institutional investors 
Inventive-Comp  = Ratio of CEO stock based compensation to his total compensation. 
OutDir Ratio  = Fraction of the board that are outside directors. 
D/V ind-adj  = Industry adjusted ratio of long-term debt to market value of the firm. 
 
Control Variables: 
 
Firm Age = Number of years since the firm first apprears on CRSP to the date of 
director resignation announcement. 
Ln Size   = Logarithm of total assets of the firm. 
ROE ind-adj = 3-digit SIC Industry adjusted ratio of net income to market value of 
equity. 
CAR1yr   = One-year CAR using value weighted market index 
 
 
 
The above results suggest that investor reaction to outsider resignation depends 
on the strength of the firm’s other governance mechanisms.  In particular, officer and 
director ownership, and non-affiliated block ownership can potentially act as substitutes 
for board independence.  I also find that higher levels of CEO incentive compensation 
require more board oversight.  Therefore, the market reaction to a loss in board 
independence is more negative for higher CEO incentive compensation. 
This analysis assumes that the outside director resignation leads to a loss in board 
independence, and inside and gray director resignation leads to a gain in board 
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independence.  This assumption may not be true if the outgoing director is replaced by 
another director of similar type.  To test whether or not director resignation really leads 
to change in board independence, I examine the board structure from the proxy 
statement available after the resignation announcement. Post-event proxy statements are 
available with a mean lag of 207 days, and thus have low reliability in capturing the true 
effect of director resignation on board independence.  I find that 67% of the events lead 
to a decrease or no change in board independence following outsider resignation.  Gray 
and inside director resignations lead to increased board independence for 63% and 80% 
of the firms respectively. 
 
Table 10 
Robustness Tests. 
 
This Table summarizes the tests conducted to check the robustness of the multivariate regression results 
reported in Table 7, 8 and 9. 
 
Panel A: Robustness Checks for the Dependent Variable 
1. CAR calculated using (-1,0), and (0,+1) windows 
2. Using market adjusted returns in place of market model CAR 
3. CARs calculated using CRSP equally-weighted index as benchmark 
4. Market model parameters are calculated using 150 trading-days data prior to the event. 
 
Panel B: Robustness Checks for the Independent Variables 
5. Corporate Governance Index constructed using different sets of variables 
6. Other variables considered: 
• Age of the outgoing director 
• Term of the outgoing director 
• Industry adjusted ROA 
• Different specifications for Governance Index 
• Gompers, Ishi, and Matrick’s (2003) governance index 
 
Panel C: Robustness Checks for the Regression Methodology 
7. Divide sample by comparing firm M/B with median M/B of entire Compustat 
8. Divide sample by time period (1990-1997), and  (1998-2000) 
9. Test for heteroscedasticity in the data 
10. Windsorize CAR data at first percentile and 99th percentile to control for outliers. 
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The robustness of the above reported results is checked and the list of robustness 
tests conducted is reported in Table 10.  The results are robust to different model 
specifications for calculation of CARs, and different benchmarks used.  I also test for the 
effect of outgoing director’s age and her office term on CAR, the regression coefficients 
on these variables is insignificant.  Furthermore, the inclusion of these variables has no 
impact on regression results.  Industry adjusted ROA behave in similar fashion as 
industry adjusted ROE.  As discussed earlier, I do not use Gompers, Ishi and Matrick 
(2003) governance index because only 79 firms from my sample are common with their 
dataset.  I also divide sample in different ways, but there is no significant impact on the 
results. 
4.4 Summary 
The evidence presented in this study suggests that investors consider board 
independence an important aspect of a firm’s governance.  Nevertheless, board 
independence is not the only mechanism that is employed to reduce agency problems.  
Other mechanisms like insider ownership, non-affiliated blockownership, top managers’ 
compensation, etc., may also provide a resolution to the agency problem.  These 
mechanisms may work independently or in combination with each other.  The results of 
my study suggest that to some extent a loss of board independence may be compensated 
for by employing other mechanisms like insider ownership and non-affiliated 
blockownership. Incentive compensation, though providing an alignment of incentives 
between CEOs and shareholders, may itself exacerbate agency problems if the high 
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levels of stock based compensation induce managers to commit accounting fraud.  In 
that case independent boards may provide important oversight. 
These results provide important implications for current changes in the 
regulatory environment.  The NYSE and Nasdaq recently changed their listing 
requirements. Listed firms are required to have a majority of independent directors.  
Exceptions to this rule are available to closely held firms, suggesting that high 
managerial ownership may substitute for board independence in improving corporate 
governance.  My results are in agreement with their notion of substitution between board 
independence and high insider ownership.  Furthermore, this study identifies other 
governance mechanisms that can resolve agency problem in the absence of an 
independent board.  The regulatory agencies may thus consider providing more 
exceptions to the requirement of board independence. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Agency problems arise when the owners (shareholders) of the firm give control 
to agents (managers) to work in their interests.  The agents may look after their own 
interests, and thus deviate from shareholder value maximization.  This deviation between 
the goals of managers and shareholders may lead to losses in firm value.  Several 
corporate governance mechanisms have been suggested to reduce agency problems.  
Some of these mechanisms are external to the firm, like external capital markets, the 
managerial labor market, etc., while others are internal to the firm, such as monitoring 
by the board of directors, separation of the CEO and Chairman positions, and levels of 
debt in the capital structure.   
Most financial researchers agree that board independence is an important 
constituent of firm’s governance.  However, much of the empirical research has found 
mixed evidence on the impact of board independence on firm performance.  Some of the 
confounding evidence on the importance of board independence may be because of 
substitutions and interactions among various governance mechanisms.  As evident from 
regulatory changes, large and influential entities such as the SEC imply that board 
independence is desirable. Therefore, it is crucial that there be more and better evidence 
regarding the importance of board independence itself and as it relates to other 
governance mechanisms in providing effective corporate governance.  
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I study the importance of board independence from the viewpoint of investors.  
An independent board, as vital as it may be, is only one of the many mechanisms 
employed by the firms to control agency cost.  The significance of board independence 
may thus depend upon the strengths of other existing governance mechanisms.  I 
examine the importance of board independence as perceived by investors conditional 
upon the existing governance structure and the firm’s business environment.   
In particular, I examine the market reaction to board member resignation 
announcements and its relation with existing governance structures and business 
environments.  This approach allows me to analyze whether or not shareholders consider 
board independence to be an important facet of firm governance, and under what 
conditions board independence may be desirable.  Specifically, I measure the market 
reaction to abrupt changes in board structure that occur due to director resignations.  I 
then classify the outgoing director as insider, gray, or outsider depending on his/her 
affiliation with the firm.  The governance mechanisms that can potentially substitute for 
board independence are then identified by regressing the market reaction to director 
resignation on other mechanisms.  This approach is based on the premise that investors 
will be less concerned over a loss in board independence when the firm has other 
potentially effective governance mechanisms in place. 
My study reveals that investors are concerned over losses in board independence.  
Firms experiencing outside director resignations lose much more of their market value at 
the time of the resignation announcement than firms experiencing inside or gray director 
resignations.  I further investigate the variation in investor reaction to director 
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resignations by examining the relation between announcement period returns and the 
strengths of other governance mechanisms.  I find that investors react more negatively to 
outside director resignations when the strength of other mechanisms, as captured by a 
corporate governance index, is low.  When individual mechanisms are considered, 
officer and director ownership and non-affiliated block ownership are found to be 
possible substitutes for board independence.  Additionally, I find that the market reaction 
to a loss in board independence is more negative for firms with higher incentive 
compensation of their CEOs.   
This study presents an important piece of evidence suggesting that investors 
consider board independence an important aspect of firm’s governance.  Yet, board 
independence is not the only mechanism that is employed to reduce agency problems.  
As suggested in the literature, other mechanisms like managerial ownership, blockholder 
ownership, top managers’ compensation, etc., may also work independently or in 
combination with each other to mitigate the agency problems of equity.  The results of 
my study suggest that the loss in board independence may be compensated for by 
employing other mechanisms like insider ownership and non-affiliated blockholder 
ownership. Incentive compensation, though it may provide alignment of incentives 
between CEOs and shareholders, may itself increase agency problems if the high levels 
of stock-based compensation induce managers to commit accounting fraud.  In that case 
independent board may provide important oversight. 
These results also have important implications for the recent changes in the 
regulatory environment.  Major stock exchanges like the NYSE and Nasdaq lately have 
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changed their listing requirements.  These changes have been accepted by the SEC and 
listed firms are now required to have a majority of independent directors.  Firms with a 
majority of stocks held by managers are allowed an exception to this rule.  This 
exception to listing requirement suggests that market regulators consider high 
managerial ownership as a substitute for board independence in improving corporate 
governance.  My results are in agreement with their notion of substitution between board 
independence and high insider ownership.  Furthermore, this study identifies other 
governance mechanisms that may help resolve agency problems in the absence of an 
independent board.  In particular, I find that high non-affiliated block ownership may 
also provide an effective alternative to board independence.  The regulatory agencies 
may thus consider providing more exceptions to the requirement of board independence. 
Like any other empirical study this study also has its own limitations.  The 
conclusions regarding the empirical findings are based on the assumption that outsider 
resignation always leads to a loss in board independence.  This assumption may be 
violated in cases there the outsider is immediately replaced by another outsider.  I 
address this issue by examining board structures from proxy statements available after 
the resignation announcements.  These proxy statements are available on average 207 
days after the resignation announcements, and thus are not a reliable source of 
information for the impact of director resignations on board independence.  Another way 
of handing this issue is to look for director appointment announcements.  However, 
director appointments may not always be publicly announced.  The other limitation of 
this study is that the sample is biased toward those firms that are more closely tracked by 
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news media.  News media may cover large firms more than small firms.  In that case the 
findings of this study may not be applicable to smaller firms. 
I use information from proxy statements to classify directors as insider, gray, or 
outsider.  This information is disclosed by the firm, and therefore may not be accurate if 
managers unintentionally or intentionally hide the true relation between the directors and 
the firm.  This problem is more pronounced in the case of outside versus gray director 
classification. 
A natural extension of this dissertation is to study the long-term impact of 
changes in board structure on firm performance.  Event study methodology captures only 
short-term impacts that may differ in cases where managers take their cues from investor 
reactions and change their policies.  Similar experiments can also be designed to study 
the impact of changes in other governance characteristics like ownership patterns on 
firm value, while controlling for the existence of other governance mechanisms. 
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